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Introduction 
Western civilization is in transition. 
Page 2 
After centuries of modernity, western culture is beginning to see the world around 
it in an entirely different worldview. For the past two to three hundred years, reason and 
empiricism ruled: if a claim couldn't be proven scientifically, or if a proposition was 
shown to be umeasonable, then that claim or proposition was discarded as untrue. Truth 
was defined as that which could be proven through reason or science. 
Of course, this posed a sticky problem for the church. After all, how could one 
scientifically prove the supernatural? How could one make a reasonable argument for a 
miracle, such as the resurrection of Christ? David Hume, a pioneer ofthe Enlightenment, 
asserted the modernist proposition that even if the resurrection did happen, it proves not 
that Christ was divine but only that he somehow managed to cheat death. Interestingly, 
however, the church made a tactical error in answering this assault of reason and science 
upon it: it chose to fight fire with fire, and created its own pseudo-science to demonstrate 
the truth of the Bible. Faith turned into apologetics-indubitable propositions "proving" 
the Scriptures. 
This attempt to fight modernism by embracing it led to three results: 1) faith 
became dependent on reason; 2) the paradoxes and mystery of God and the scriptures 
were harmonized in one-dimensional, often anti-intellectual interpretations; and 3) the 
church found itself still shackled to modernity when the world view unexpectedly shifted 
to postmodernism. 
First, in trying to reasonably prove Christianity, the church made faith a result of 
reason instead of the other way around. Faith depended upon that which could be seen or 
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proven, or else it wasn't valid. This offered a very shallow faith-one that the world has 
not found appealing, to judge by the steady decline of the church in the twentieth century1 
despite the barrage of apologetic resources and speakers flooding the continents. These 
apologetics might have convinced the church; unfortunately, it isn't the church that needs 
convincing, but the world. And the world's response has been ho-hum at best. 
This led to the second effect of modernism on the church. In order to reasonably 
prove Christianity, the church needed a reliable authority that was consistent with the 
laws of reason. The Bible, which Christians considered the word of God, was that 
authority; however, what was to be done with its obvious paradoxes and anomalies, 
which ran contrary to reason? Modern Christians found they had to work to harmonize 
these inconsistencies lest their reliable authority be deemed unreasonable-but in doing 
so, they shoehorned an infinitely mysterious God into their little theological boxes. 
Again, the world was not convinced. In fact, the tactic backfired when literary and textual 
critics pointed out vehemently that the modern Christians' attempts to harmonize 
scripture were anti-intellectual at best, and dishonest at worst. 
Finally, there is the issue of the church awkwardly caught in the death grip of 
modernity as contemporary philosophers began to deconstruct scientism and chip away at 
propositions that have been embraced as truth for several generations. Theologian Karl 
Barth once said that "when the church weds itself to the spirit of the age, it will find itself 
a widow in the next."2 As history enters the third millennium A.D., that is precisely the 
predicament in which the western church finds itself 
1 For extensive documentation on the decline in 201h-century church attendance and membership, 
see Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-1990 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1997). 
2 Comment made by Barth in casual conversation and repeated by Larry Shelton, Th.D., Professor 
of Wesleyan Theology at George Fox University, Portland, Oregon, 1999. 
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In the 18th and 19th centuries, the church embraced modernism gradually, but in 
the end so completely that the modernist worldview and the church itself became 
inseparable. At the end of the 201h century, the church is preparing to repeat its mistake: 
in an attempt to be relevant to the postmodern culture, it is embracing postmodernism just 
as it formerly embraced modernism. This is a serious danger because, as Barth warned, a 
church married to the current paradigm will be left with nothing when the paradigm 
changes. Paradigms come and go; what happens when the postmodern paradigm dies the 
same death as modernity? 
And there is no doubt that it will. Postmodernism is a transitional paradigm-a 
corrective reaction to modernism. Modernism is, in a sense, postmodernism's life-force: 
once modernism breathes its last, postmodernism-which exists only to deconstruct 
modernism, rebel against its empiricism and rationalism, and shatter its idol of 
scientism-will follow. 
Soon, therefore, the church will once again find itself in the awkward position of 
trying to distance itself from a paradigm it unwisely rushed to adopt in the name of 
"reaching the culture." So what is the church to do? How can Christians avoid riding the 
pendulum back and forth with each new paradigm shift-or is it even possible? 
C. S. Lewis: a Model for Consideration 
A compelling answer might be found in the life of C. S. Lewis-probably 
Christianity's most popular spokesperson of the twentieth century. Decades after his 
death, Lewis' books maintain phenomenal appeal, still selling more than 1.5 million 
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copies each year in the 1990s.3 The atheist-turned-theist-turned-Christian is considered a 
theologian to the masses-a layman's apologist. Even his books for children are filled 
with theological truths, yet utterly readable and engaging. Citing examples such as 
Aesop's Fables and Pilgrim's Progress, one scholar points out that while most classic 
literature migrates from adult libraries to the nursery, Lewis' astounding achievement is 
that his books written for the nursery-especially the Narnia Chronicles-are so moving 
and profound that they have "ended in the library--even the libraries oftheologians."4 
Why? What is the appeal of C. S. Lewis? Why have millions of people of all ages 
found him so irresistible for so many years? One explanation is that he appeals to the 
modern mind with his use of rational argument. In Mere Christianity, his foundational 
claims, representational theory of language, and clear use of reason build upon the work 
of Immanuel Kant and other writers of the Enlightenment. 
While highly acclaimed in modernist circles, however, Lewis' appeal reaches into 
postmodernist circles as well. His creation of different worlds and realities, his emphasis 
on divine mystery, his use of narrative to present his theology, his spirituality, and his 
mystical experiences (such as his lifelong search for the experience he called Joy, which 
he always capitalized), and even his seemingly self-contradictory claims of anti-
foundationalism are clearly aspects of postmodernism. 
This is a paradox: postmodernism is by definition the opposite of modernism, the 
former having come into being for the sole purpose of reacting against and 
deconstructing the latter. How, therefore, can Lewis communicate so effectively to the 
modernist and the postmodernist alike, since they are opposed to each other? Can a 
3 George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994 ), 413. 
4 John Wilson, "An Appraisal of C. S. Lewis and his Influence on Modem Evangelicalism," 
Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 9 (Spring 1991 ): 33. 
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person be a modernist and a postmodernist at the same time, or is there another paradigm 
that transcends both? 
To answer this, one must look beyond the two paradigms-which, for the 
contemporary philosopher, is nearly impossible. All persons now living have experienced 
only these two paradigms-roughly, modernism in the first half of this century and 
postmodernism in the second. For them, trying to comprehend anything else is like a 
tribal New Guinean trying to comprehend Philadelphia without ever having seen it: even 
if a member of the tribe traveled there and returned to relate what she had experienced, 
the others, having lived all their lives knowing only their own culture and their own 
ways, would have difficulty understanding. 
Nonetheless, while attempting to answer the question concerning Lewis' appeal to 
both modernists and postmodernists, it can be argued that there is indeed a third paradigm 
with which the current populace is unfamiliar. In other words, the reason for Lewis' 
enduring popularity and relevance is that he is neither a modernist nor a postmodemist, 
but instead represents a third, unnamed paradigm which uses the strengths of both. 
Viewing Lewis Through a Single Lens 
To understand the paradox of C. S. Lewis as a paradigmatic figure-neither a 
modernist nor a postmodernist-it is instructive to read scholarly attempts to place Lewis 
neatly in one camp or the other. One such attempt is made by philosopher John 
Beversluis. 
Beversluis, approaching the world as a modernist, makes the mistake of 
interpreting Lewis through an exclusively modernist worldview and trying to force him 
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into a single paradigm. He therefore dismisses as a contradiction any variation from 
modernism, and especially from modernistic rationalism in Lewis' writings, when the 
fault lies not with the writings but with Beversluis' own single-focus lens. 
Beversluis reveals his unbending modernist mindset even in the way he 
approaches his subject. He divides Lewis' entire case for believing in God into three neat 
categories: the Argument from Desire, the Argument from Moral Law, and the Argument 
from Reason. 5 Then he dispatches each one in turn by comparing it only to the modernist 
ideal of rationalism, evidently unable to imagine any other standard of comparison. 
First, the Argument from Desire focuses on Lewis' lifelong quest for Joy. Based 
on the famous conversion story in which Lewis calls himself "the most reluctant convert 
in all of England," 6 Beversluis tries to catch Lewis in a contradiction by asking: Why 
would a person be so reluctant to meet the Object of the Joy he had desired all his life?7 
In addition to an apparent inability to comprehend the conflict of a sinner meeting 
a holy God (in fact, the scriptures are filled with persons who desired God but recoiled 
from him in utter awe or terror),8 the question reveals the error of believing, and 
believing that Lewis believed, that the way to faith is through reason. Beversluis 
dismisses Lewis' simultaneous attraction and aversion to God as unreasonable, and 
therefore untenable. However, a careful reading of Lewis' writings will show that 
although many of his works-especially Mere Christianity, Miracles, The Problem of 
Pain and The Abolition of Man-defended Christianity with reason and logic, Lewis 
5 John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans, 1985), 7. 
6 C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1955), 228. 
7 Beversluis, 20 
8 See Genesis 3:8, Isaiah 6:5, Ezekiel1:28, Daniel10:7-8, Jonah 1:3, Acts 9:4, Revelation 1:17, 
and many others. 
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never referred to reason when describing Joy.9 To him, it was obviously beyond reason, 
above reason. Beversluis' insistence that the experience of faith be forced exclusively 
into the grid of modem rationalism is a great blunder, certainly not supported by the 
works of Lewis as a whole. 
Next, Beversluis attacks Lewis' Argument from Moral Law. Lewis pointed out 
that people everywhere have an innate sense of lawfulness and unlawfulness, as shown 
by universal cries such as "That's not right!" and "That's not fair!" Since this internal law 
clearly exists, he argues, there must be an author of the law; he calls it "Something 
Behind" the law. 10 Beversluis declaims this as "a very poor argument, one that can be 
disposed ofwith unusual speed"11-which he attempts to do as follows: 
Summary of Lewis' argument 
1) If there is Something behind the facts 
observed by science, it cannot manifest 
itself externally ... .it must remain 
entirely unknown or it must make itself 
known in some other way. 
2) [There is] an internal command urging 
us to behave morally [which] cannot be 
observed by science .... 
3) Therefore there is Something [a Power] 
behind the Moral Law. 
Example of similar argument 
1) If you are to pass this test, you will have 
to study very hard. 
2) You did study very hard. 
3) Therefore you will pass this test. 12 
He uses the obvious fallacy of the second argument to claim that Lewis' argument 
is parallel and therefore equally fallacious, according to logic and reason. However, he 
employs only one of modernism's two main definitions of reason: "pure reason," which 
9 Instead, he used the language of poetry, myth, and mystery; see the whole of Surprised by Joy, 
especially 16-18, 72-73, and 219-222. 
10 See Lewis, Mere Christianity, "What Lies Behind the Law," 31-35. The concept of"Something 
Behind" creation, science, and Moral Law permeates the chapter; the actual words appear on p. 32, in a 
section on science. 
11 Beversluis, 51. 
12 Ibid., 50-51. 
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is limited to the experience of space and time and discounts anything else as an 
"illusion."13 However, Kant presents an alternate view called "practical reason," which is 
"not of a logical but of a moral nature. " 14 It is practical reason Lewis uses when he 
defends Christianity by arguing for the existence of a Moral Law. 
To add to this, Stephan Korner writes, "The Critique of Pure Reason, which is 
concerned with our judgements [sic] of fact, is expressly aware that we also judge that 
certain things which are not fact, ought to be fact." 15 
In comparing pure reason and practical reason, Grenz and Olson assert that Kant 
"was convinced that certain rational principles control all valid moral judgments, just as 
other rational principles lie at the foundation of all theoretical or sense-based 
knowledge." 16 Hendrikus Berkhof presents a summary of Kant's view of practical reason 
as related but superior to pure reason: "For him intellect, pure reason, and practical 
reason are the three floors of a building. The windows of these floors offer different 
views of the outside world. On the first, one sees the world of the senses; on the second, 
the faraway blue skies. The third opens to a wide landscape. From here one also sees the 
overall connection with the views ofthe lower floors." 17 
Beversluis cannot "make the jump" with Lewis from pure reason to practical 
reason, and thus finds Lewis' Argument from Morality inconclusive. 
Lewis, in fact, sees a clear progression of reason from Moral Law, after the 
fashion of Kant and his categorical imperative. This will be explored later, but for now, 
13 Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology: Report of a Personal Journey, trans. John 
Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1989), 2. 
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 Stephan Komer, Kant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 129. 
16 Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, 20'11-Century Theology: God and the World in a 
Transitional Age (Downer's Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1992), 27. 
17 Berkhof, 6. 
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the point is to show how a critic viewing Lewis through a single worldview may 
misinterpret Lewis, leading to an inaccurate critique. 
Finally, Beversluis addresses the Argument from Reason. According to 
Beversluis, Lewis believed that all knowledge hinges on valid reasoning 18 (which Lewis 
did not, as has been shown) and that reason "commits us to believing in a superior 
Mind."19 He charges, however, that Lewis violates basic principles oflogic, fails to prove 
his argument, and grossly oversimplifies complex theological issues: 
Within the compass of less than fifty pages he attempts to prove the 
objectivity of morality, to refute ethical relativism and ethical 
subjectivism, to establish the existence of a Power behind the Moral Law, 
to show that atheism is too simple and theological liberalism too na"ive, to 
prove that Jesus is God and that orthodox Christianity is the only view that 
faces all the facts, and to offer some practical advice about how too deal 
with conflicting theories of atonement-all this before wrapping things up 
with a resounding appeal to accept God's offer of salvation while there is 
still time.20 
At the end of his critique, Beversluis has packaged Lewis into a tidy bundle: 
Lewis' apologetics, he feels, are effectively shown to be irrational, irresponsible and 
ignorant, communicated with an arrogant contempt for philosophical and epistemological 
principles. But Beversluis' argument is an incomplete study based on an erroneous 
premise. Lewis does not fit completely into a modernist world view. In fact, the failure of 
Beversluis and others to "get" Lewis simply proves that he has more range and depth 
than they. 
First, Lewis' apparent simplicity is perhaps not so simple. For example, just as 
Beversluis charges that Lewis' autobiography, Surprised by Joy, consists more of 
18 Beversluis, 75. 
19 Ibid., 58. 
20 Beversluis, 33 
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apologetics than autobiography,21 one could reply that Mere Christianity is as much 
autobiography as apologetics. Beversluis sees the latter book solely as the progression of 
an argument. How might he critique it differently if he saw it as the progression of a 
life-the story of Lewis' own progression from atheism to theism to Christianity? If Mere 
Christianity recounts Lewis' own intellectual journey, then its simplicity is irrelevant; it 
worked for Lewis and is therefore valid. 
Further, concerning Beversluis' charge that Lewis' apologetics are simplistic, it 
should be noted that simplicity does not invalidate an argument. The example of Jesus 
comes to mind. 
Finally, Beversluis' strongest point is made in the Argument from Reason. He 
revels in British philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe's challenge to Lewis' reasoning in 
1948, which might have prompted Lewis rework his book Miracles for later editions.22 
Lewis himself never claimed to be an expert logician; he argued ideas, not fine points as 
philosophers such as Anscombe (and Beversluis) like to do. 
It could be mentioned, however, that although Lewis reworked his arguments for 
a later edition of Miracles, he never renounced his central claims. Perhaps Lewis' 
Argument from Reason does not stand up under a microscope of pure reason, but Lewis 
did not seem to think that that microscope was the only lens through which truth could be 
viewed. 
In fact, it is amazing to see Beversluis try to compare Lewis' two great treatises 
on suffering while retaining this same single-lens perspective. Beversluis compares The 
Problem of Pain, written in 1940, which he declares an intelligible position, to A Grief 
21 Beversluis, 9-10. 
22 Beversluis, 65-69. 
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Observed-in which, he says, Lewis' "confidence was nonexistent, his worries all-
consuming, and his argument incoherent" 23-with complete disregard for the personal 
experiences Lewis had suffered between the two. 
To Beversluis, in other words, A Grief Observed is not the journal of a widower 
in agony, pouring out his rage and confusion toward God, but the treatise of an individual 
with a "strategy,"24 trying to keep his apologetic dike plugged in the midst of seeming 
injustice. Beversluis' mistake would be humorous, if it weren't so sad. He is unable to 
distinguish between an apology and a journal. Of modernism's shortcomings, this is 
perhaps its greatest: logic, reason and apologetics do not comprehend anguish. This has 
led other scholars to reject Beversluis' critique of Lewis because he "misrepresents Lewis 
in ways that are simply inexcusable" and "ignores every development in recent 
philosophy that would support Lewis on specific points."25 (It is also interesting to note 
that Beversluis does not even attempt to tackle any of Lewis' fiction or the apologetics 
found in it. Could this be because of modernism's limited understanding of reality, or 
perhaps because modernism cannot perceive truth in any form other than cold, hard 
reason?) 
Beversluis' greatest misstep is in trying to box a person in, as any good modernist 
would do, and then tear down that box from within his own worldview. He tries to 
understand Lewis through his own rationalistic worldview and thus reaches faulty 
conclusions. 
23 Beversluis, 162. 
24 Bevers luis, 163. 
25 Thomas Talbott, "C. S. Lewis and the Problem of Evil," Christian Scholar's Review 17, no. I 
(1987): 37. 
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An Overview of Studies of C. S. Lewis 
Although C. S. Lewis is known for his rational defense of Christianity in works 
such as Mere Christianity, The Abolition of Man and The Problem of Pain, it is perhaps 
somewhat ironic that showing his modernist side is more difficult than one might expect. 
While he sets out, like a true modernist, to place Christianity on a solid foundation of 
reason in Mere Christianity, he also establishes clear limits to-and criticisms of-
scientism, which has been called the religion of twentieth-century modernism?6 
Ever since men were able to think, they have been wondering what this 
universe really is and how it came to be there. And, very roughly, two 
views have been held. First, there is what is called the materialist view. 
People who take that view think that matter and space just happen to exist, 
and always have existed, nobody knows why; ... The other view is the 
religious view ... [and you] cannot find out which view is the right one by 
science in the ordinary sense .... Do not think I am saying anything against 
science: I am only saying what its job is .... and a very useful and necessary 
job it is too. But why anything comes to be there at all, and whether there 
is anything behind the things science observes .. .is not a scientific 
question.27 
As a renowned literary critic, Lewis also saw both the value and the limits of 
textual criticism in establishing the trustworthiness of the Bible.28 Rational science is not 
thebe-all and end-all of discovering truth. In fact, Lewis' most effective way of 
communicating theological issues is not through rational analysis, as in Mere 
Christianity, but through narrative and allegory, as in The Space Trilogy, The Screwtape 
Letters, The Chronicles of Narnia, and The Great Divorce. Clearly, it is difficult to pour 
26 See Lawrence Cahoone, ed., From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1996), 12; Nancey Murphy & James Wm. McClendon, "Distinguishing Modem and 
Postmodern Theologies," Modern Theology, 5, no. 3 (April1989): 192. 
27 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1952), 31-32. 
28 Richard B. Cunningham, C. S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 
1967), 91. 
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Lewis into a mold of pure modernism, as evidenced by the problems of those like 
Beversluis who have tried to do so. 
Much that has been written about Lewis centers on what may be called his 
defensive apologetic versus his imaginative apologetic. The first method entails a simple, 
colloquial use of foundationalism and reason to offer logical proof of God's existence. 
The second enlists story and allegory to communicate theological truths. The question 
then arises: if Lewis felt equally at home communicating in both realms-modern 
foundationalism and postmodern narrative-why and how did he select which medium to 
use when? Why did he so vigorously employ them both at various times, and with great 
versatility? The answer lies in Lewis' primary motivation of evangelism. 
Lewis the Evangelist 
"The proper study of shepherds is sheep, not (save accidentally) other shepherds. 
And woe to you if you do not evangelize," Lewis said once, in a paper he was reading at 
Cambridge. 29 It is interesting that despite explicit statements like this and many other 
expressions, there has been debate over the motivation behind the writings of C. S. 
Lewis. The discussion has become dichotomized, categorizing Lewis either as a defender 
of and apologist for Christianity, or as an evangelist. 
John Wilson argues that Lewis was "an apologist, not an evangelist" because, 
although he clearly believed in salvation only through the cross of Christ, he "refused to 
go further."30 This is expressed not as a criticism, but as proof that Lewis should be 
considered a "defender of faith" rather than an evangelist. However, it is not clear what 
Wilson meant by going "further" or what, according to Wilson, one must do to gain 
29 C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1967), 152. 
30 Wilson, "An Appraisal of C. S. Lewis," 27; see also 35. 
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entrance into the "evangelist" locker room. Wilson would do better to say that Lewis' 
style was apologetic rather than evangelistic. It is entirely possible for a person to be both 
an apologist and an evangelist, and Lewis' life indicates that he was. 
In fact, there is strong evidence that evangelism was the driving force behind his 
apologetic works. Evangelism was very important to Lewis. It was not tent-meeting 
evangelism or door-to-door evangelism, but this does not disqualify him as an evangelist. 
Lewis communicated to ordinary folk. Even Wilson acknowledges admiringly: 
"Lewis wrote, in simple language, on profound subjects .... He was a brilliant debater but, 
at heart, he was always appealing to commonsense."31 To illustrate Lewis' great skill in 
this area, Wilson uses the delightful example of Lewis' statement that, to understand 
Almighty God's limiting of himself to human form, one should try to imagine oneself 
b . I 32 ecommg a s ug. 
Indeed, Lewis' communications did reach far beyond the walls of the church and 
were intended to do so. He became world famous when his series of articles, published as 
the instant bestseller The Screwtape Letters in 1941, appeared in the now defunct 
Guardian newspaper. For the next three years he had a series of talks on BBC radio, later 
compiled as Broadcast Talks (in the U.S., The Case for Christianity), Christian Behavior, 
and Beyond Personality, and finally published as Mere Christianity in 1952. He spoke at 
R.A.F. bases and filled Oxford's University Church when he lectured there, something 
only one other person-the Archbishop--could do.33 
In all these pursuits, Lewis was not "preaching to the choir," as the saying goes, 
but to those unfamiliar with Christian jargon and scripture. Ifthe newspaper articles, 
31 Ibid., 35. 
32 Ibid.; the original quote is in Lewis, Mere Christianity, 155. 
33 Cunningham, 31-32. 
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radio broadcasts and public lectures were meant for the masses, then why would the 
subsequent books not be? In fact, both books-as well as most of his other works-are 
evangelistic in nature, intended for unbelievers. Lewis' speeches were primarily in 
defense of Christianity, and in this sense Wilson is correct; however, since they were 
directed to general audiences, evangelism-the desire to share the gospel with the 
masses-was the intent. 
"You may have felt you were ready to listen to me as long as you thought I had 
anything new to say; but if it turns out to be only religion, well, the world has tried that 
and you cannot put the clock back. If anyone is feeling that way I should like to say three 
things to him,"34 says Lewis, obviously speaking to unbelievers. He then goes on to 
defend the gospel by saying the "three things" and a good many more, anticipating their 
objections and using language that would be familiar to them. Through simplicity in 
argument, use of common language, and establishment of a target reader, it is 
demonstrated that the motivation behind the writings mentioned here (and many others 
too numerous to discuss) is evangelistic in nature. 
Lewis the Rational Apologist 
Most contemporary scholars, and even Lewis himself, have agreed that Lewis was 
a rationalist. Lewis placed a high value on reason and used it effectively in his arguments, 
appealing to unbelievers who trusted in their own thinking rather than in scripture. His 
plan of attack was to find an indubitable foundation upon which believers and 
34 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 36. 
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unbelievers cannot disagree, and progress from there. Lewis not only suggested that 
Christianity could be scrutinized by the tests of reason; he insisted that it should be. 35 
Richard B. Cunningham says Lewis had great confidence that reason would come 
down on the side of Christianity-that "reason faithfully pursued is a path that leads to 
God."36 Cunningham says reason "helps clarify one's immortal longings and, when 
rigorously followed, can lead to a theistic position, and then to revelation and the door of 
faith."37 As much as Lewis respected reason, however, he seems to have disagreed with 
Cunningham that it was the primary or only way to faith, stating instead that all our 
knowledge depends on a mix of authority, reason, and experience?8 
Richard Purtill emphasizes Lewis' view that faith and reason are not opposed to 
each other. Unlike many Christians who see the two as enemies, Lewis embraced the title 
of Christian rationalist. He believed, according to Purtill, that "faith should be based on 
the evidence, not fly in the face of the evidence. "39 He points out, as others do, that Lewis 
delineated two types of faith: Faith-A, an intellectual faith, and Faith-B, a religious faith. 
These have been described in various ways-Beversluis called the first "philosophical," 
40 and Purtill called the second "faith as a commitment to God"41-but most researchers 
on the subject do distinguish between them in some way. Purtill says that "our age is 
different from many previous ages in that many people are half-educated: not wise 
enough to assess the arguments for God, not simple enough to trust 'all those wise men' 
who have. Therefore, in our days a number of Christians are confused about their grounds 
35 Cunningham, 77. 
36 Ibid., 79. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Lewis, Christian Reflections, 41. 
39 Richard L. Purtill, C. S. Lewis's Case for the Christian Faith (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1981), 
72. 
40 Beversluis, 7. 
41 
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for belief. When their faith is challenged, they either abandon their commitment or retreat 
to a sort of stubborn insistence: 'Don't confuse me with the arguments; I know it's 
true. "'42 
Purtill suggests that this is perhaps why Lewis is so popular: he appeals to an 
"appetite" for argument that exists in the ordinary Christian. While it is sometimes 
claimed that faith is just a "leap in the dark,"43 most Christians desire to know that what 
they believe is true. Lewis' ability to argue such complex and abstract ideas in language 
used by the laity appeals to and satisfies that appetite. 
However, not all scholars share the view that Lewis esteemed rational apologetics 
above all else. Robert Holyer presents a deeper Lewis, one who used reason when he saw 
fit but did not rely on it to "make or break" the Christian faith. 
Holyer agrees that Lewis' rational arguments were '"absolutely compelling' to 
any rational mind," but immediately adds that Lewis always said belief in God "could 
never be based on arguments that compelling-indeed, that demonstration of this sort 
would prove inimical to faith."44 In other words, apologetics that pass the test of reason 
could still be hostile to belief in God, because belief based solely on reason no longer 
requires faith. 
Holyer also makes the important point that besides reason, Lewis also appeals 
directly to human experience and to the imagination. In many cases, his goal was not to 
show that Christianity is irrefutably true by rational proofs, but simply to show that 
"religious beliefs are neither produced, nor ultimately assured, by argument alone but 
150. 
42 Ibid., 79. 
43 Ibid., 78. 
44 Robert Holyer, "C. S. Lewis- The Rationalist?" Christian Scholar's Review 18, no. 2 (1988), 
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by ... feelings and desires as well." 45 Holyer, unlike Beversluis, perceives that Lewis is 
able to use more than one paradigm to communicate the gospel, and thus he comes to a 
much deeper and more accurate understanding of Lewis. 
As western society moves fully into a postmodern paradigm, contemporary 
scholars might be tempted to leave behind Lewis' emphasis on reason and focus instead 
on his use of postmodern elements such as narrative, spirituality and mysticism. 
However, while it is a mistake to see Lewis as a total modernist, painting him as purely 
postmodern would be just as wrong. Indeed, Lewis placed a tremendous significance on 
reason, using it variously to prove the Christian faith, or merely to remove obstacles to 
faith. But reason does not complete his case for Christianity. 
Lewis the Imaginative Apologist 
Scholars have struggled with trying to define Lewis' other methods. Wilson 
defines these as "imaginative apologetics" and cites the Space Trilogy as just one 
example of how much theology Lewis packs into his stories. Wilson argues that, though 
they can be read as fairy tales, "they are full of images and symbols which are easily 
interpreted. This can give aesthetic delight-we can see the hidden meaning."46 Finally, 
Wilson argues that reason and imagination are not dichotomous but complementary: "It 
seems to me that both reason and imagination are necessary for apologetics; Lewis had 
both. I suspect the sad truth is that, for many Christians, one of these faculties is 
missing."47 
45 Ibid., 163. 
46 Wilson, "An Appraisal of C. S. Lewis," 33. 
47 Ibid., 37. 
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If Cunningham saw reason as total to Lewis' method, Ralph C. Wood places 
Lewis on the opposite end of the spectrum and argues that Lewis' strength is clearly his 
imagination. First, however, Wood's comments against Lewis' apologetic writings, while 
not relevant to his case for Lewis' imaginative writings, should be mentioned for the sake 
of thorough discussion. 
In a lengthy section, Wood decries Lewis' rational apologetics as his weakest 
work-Mere Christianity "mangles" the gospel and The Problem of Pain is "wrong"-
and dismisses Lewis' interest in reason as merely a holdover from the part it played in 
Lewis' own conversion, saying, "We are seldom argued into the Kingdom. "48 This last 
point is not in debate-Lewis himself doubted that reason alone could convert anyone-
and the former points are disputed by the many who, believers or not, have found Lewis' 
apologetics either intellectually brilliant or spiritually life-changing. However, Wood 
says all this merely to make his point, which is that Lewis' imaginative work is "his best 
and most readable confession of the gospel. "49 
Wood's praise for Lewis' use of narrative is poignant. He claims that Lewis 
sought to do for others what the writings of George Macdonald had done for Lewis 
himself: baptize the imagination50 by explaining difficult ideas, such as Sehnsucht and the 
nature of holiness, through the reader's own imagination. 
"Essentially imagination was for Lewis just what the common use of the term 
would suggest: an exceptionally inventive way of seeing things ... .it was, first and 
48 Ralph C. Wood, "The Baptized Imagination: C. S. Lewis's Fictional Apologetics," The 
Christian Centwy 112 (30 August -6 September 1995), 813. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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foremost, images."51 says Robert Houston Smith. The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, 
for example, began not with an idea for a theme or a plot, but with an image in Lewis' 
mind of a faun walking through the snow, holding an umbrella. From this, the rest of the 
story began to unfold. 52 
According to Smith, Lewis believed imagination was not only a good way, but the 
best and sometimes only way to communicate higher truths; he strongly disagreed that 
anything imaginative is automatically false. 53 In a detailed explanation, Smith traces the 
branches of Lewis' imaginative apologetics: 1) allegory, which Lewis later abandoned as 
too artificial; 2) analogy, which he found much more to his liking and used extensively in 
all his works; 3) myth, which Smith contends was Lewis' favorite form of 
communication; and 4) children's fiction, although Smith makes the point that, for 
example, the Namia tales are really adult fiction written for children and the Space 
Trilogy is really a child's fairy tale for grownups. 54 
Another way to view Lewis' imaginative apologetic is to see Christianity the way 
he saw it: as myth. Stratford Caldecott notes that Lewis the atheist and Lewis the 
Christian both saw Christianity as a myth, but for very different reasons. Lewis the atheist 
saw Christianity as a fairy tale presented with the appearance of truth. However, Lewis 
the Christian acknowledged that Christianity is indeed myth, defined as a story of 
supernatural deity interacting with humanity, and also identified the other defining 
elements: 1) a hero, whose birth is marked with supernatural favor; 2) an oppressive 
51 Robert Houston Smith, Patches ofGodlight: The Pattern ofThought of C. S. Lewis (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1981), 141. 
52 Ibid., 142. 
53 Ibid., 136. 
54 Ibid., 145-151. I propose that examples of these four categories might be: 1) Pilgrim's Regress, 
The Great Divorce; 2) metaphors used everywhere throughout both his fiction and his nonfiction, such as 
the earlier one about the slug or the famous one about pain being God's megaphone (The Problem of Pain, 
95); 3) Perelandra, Till We Have Faces; and 4) The Narnia Chronicles, The Space Trilogy. 
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enemy; and 3) a task in which only the hero can fulfill-recovering a treasure closely 
guarded by the enemy55 (in this case, of course, the souls of his people). Caldecott 
describes the Christian myth as "the Drama within all drama, the Story that all good 
stories reflect. The overcoming of death by infinite Love is the Quest at the heart of every 
quest, and the sacrifice that makes it possible is the essence of all heroism. In the 
Gospels, literal truth and universal symbolism, history and legend, time and eternity 
coincide."56 
Christians are often uneasy with this idea, primarily because they associate 
"myth" more with the concept of "make-believe" than with the concept of mystery and 
profound truth. A popular definition of myth is something that is not true-a fiction, a 
fable, a fairy tale. Thus, to define Christianity as myth is to belittle the faith. But this is a 
limited view of myth. It is through myth that a Christian may come to understand 
spiritual truth. Through myth, things which take enormous courage to believe but which 
cannot be proved or disproved, such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ, can suddenly be 
understood as reasonable. Perhaps it could be said, as Lewis might have said, that faith 
must ultimately walk through the door of the imagination. Caldecott concludes his 
treatment of Lewis' use of faith and imagination by saying that " ... as Lewis found in his 
own life, Christian myth becomes Christian experience and in due course, in God's good 
time, the proofs from experience that we lacked in the beginning are ours as well. For we 
do not walk in the dark forever. "57 
55 Stratford Caldecott, "Speaking the Truths Only the Imagination May Grasp: Myth and 'Real 
Life," in The Pilgrim's Guide, ed. David Mills (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 90. 
56 Ibid., 92. 
57 Ibid., 97. 
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Corbin Scott Carnell takes the "baptized imagination" concept to another level, 
focusing not on the stories Lewis wrote but on the story he lived. Through the Inklings, a 
group of intellectuals who met for hours each week in a local pub, batting around theories 
of theology and language, Lewis' mystical understanding of Christianity matured. He 
was shaped the most through his intellectual sparring with Owen Barfield about 
imagination, reason and language, and especially through his deep friendship with 
Charles Williams: 
Atheism had appealed to Lewis as a dogmatic system, something one 
could prove by hardhitting dialectic. His earliest efforts in theology after 
he became a practicing Anglican show that he would have liked to make 
Christianity as neat and foolproof as atheism had once seemed .... As 
Lewis came under the influence of Williams' eclectic thought with its 
strongly mystical bent, certain important changes resulted .... [Through] 
this friend who lived his loyalties contagiously yet without seeking to 
defend them with compulsive logic, Lewis' ideas were reshaped [to allow] 
paradoxes, ironies, and tensions .... "58 
This was a crucial step in Lewis' dawning awareness that reason could not 
account for everything, and that imaginative story or myth often revealed different or 
deeper truths than logic. Carnell even suggests that Williams' influence in these areas 
was directly responsible for most of Lewis' best work. 59 
By all accounts, however, the most significant influence upon Lewis' developing 
imagination was the work of George Macdonald. Lewis read him avidly and admired 
both his deep spiritual devotion and his "ability to make the crimson and gold of 
mythopoeic never-never lands the vehicle of Christian truth."60 Macdonald moved Lewis 
toward more metaphysical and symbolic uses of language to express the highest truths 
58 Corbin Scott Carnell, Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C. S. Lewis (Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1974), 63. 
59 Ibid., 64-65. 
60 Ibid., 68. 
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until he learned to find meaning in both reason and imagination. Carnell argues that "it is 
this dual approach which makes him unusual in an age when it has been fashionable 
either to damn reason and live for art or to reject artistic statement as empirically 
meaningless. "61 
This is the key to understanding Lewis' appeal to both modernists and 
postmodernists. Lewis virtually married intellect to imagination; his uniqueness is his 
ability to operate easily in both realms-the rational world of the modernist, and the 
imaginative world ofthe postmodernist. 
The Modern Lewis 
Along the timeline of western history, modernism is a mere glitch, appearing for 
only about three hundred years before dissolving away again in the second half of the 20th 
century. Its starting point is debatable: some say it was the 16th-century Reformation, 
when authority shifted from the church to the individual, and thought shifted from belief 
to the skepticism of Erasmus and Montaigne; some pinpoint the 1 ih -century scientific 
revolution of Galileo, Newton, Descartes and others; other argue for the 18th -century 
French and American Revolutions, or even the 19th-century industrial revolution ofthe 
1800s.62 One theory determines its starting point not by the calendar but by Descartes' 
assertion ("I think, therefore I am"), which gave the individual a central position in the 
universe and viewed him as an autonomous, rational being. 63 In view of all these factors, 
a practical starting point is the beginning of the 18th_century Enlightenment. 
61 Ibid., 72. 
62 Cahoone, Introduction to From Modernism to Pas/modernism, 13. 
63 Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Pas/modernism (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996), 
2-3. 
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Lawrence Cahoone defines modernism as the notable rise of numerous factors, 
including rationalism, individualism, humanism, capitalism, secularization, 
democratization, and significant advances in science and industry.64 In summary, it can 
be seen as the birth of a civilization "founded on scientific knowledge of the world and 
rational knowledge of value, which places the highest premium on individual human life 
and freedom, and believes that such freedom and rationality will lead to social progress 
through virtuous, self-controlled work, creating a better material, political, and 
intellectual life for all"-or, on the negative side, a movement of "ethnic and class 
domination, European imperialism, anthropocentrism, the destruction of nature, the 
dissolution of community and tradition, the rise of alienation, the death of individuality in 
bureaucracy. "65 
Modernism is a large area of study with many facets. To discover tendencies 
toward modernism in some of Lewis' writings, it is useful to compare them to a 
manageable model of modernism. Nancey Murphy and James McClendon have created a 
helpful model which groups the characteristics of modernism into three axes: 
epistemological foundationalism, the representational-expressivist theory of language, 
and atomism or reductionism. 66 
The Epistemological Axis 
Epistemological foundationalism is "the view that knowledge can be justified 
only by finding indubitable 'foundational' beliefs upon which it is constructed."67 Every 
claim must be justified by supporting claims that are also justified, either by reason or by 
64 Cahoone, 11. 
65 Ibid., 12. 
66 Murphy/McClendon, 192. 
67 Ibid., 192. 
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empirical evidence, until one reaches a foundational proposition which cannot be 
disputed and thus requires no further justification; if not, the argument becomes circular 
and must be rejected. Since the modernist questions and discards any claims found to be 
circular or without foundation, a natural effect of foundationalism is skepticism. 
Therefore, Murphy and McClendon establish an epistemological axis with optimistic 
foundationalism at one pole and pessimistic skepticism at the other. 68 
Depending on one's perspective, Mere Christianity is either Lewis' most popular 
and complete defense of Christianity or the most flawed. It is probably the book most 
quoted by his supporters and the most criticized by his opponents. As has been 
mentioned, the book describes a teleological apologetic and perhaps the same rational 
journey Lewis himself went through on his road from atheism to theism to Christianity. 
Although not every reader has been convinced, the argument in Mere Christianity-along 
with his personal experience-did convince Lewis. 
So what is Lewis' message? Since his intended audience was unbelievers, he did 
not use the Bible to make his case. He started with good and evil, sin and sin's 
consequences, believing his hearers could not fathom grace or forgiveness until they were 
conscious of sin. 69 Therefore he developed his argument in three steps: 1) we are aware 
of the existence of a Moral Law; 2) since there is a Moral Law, there must also be an 
author, Something Behind that law; and 3) since evil exists, not on its own but only as a 
rebellion against good, there must be a good for it to rebel against. He concluded that this 
was the God described in Christianity. Stan Grenz and Roger Olson describe Kant's 
position, which foreshadows that of Lewis: "Religion could be established, [Kant] 
68 Ibid., 192-193. 
69 Michael H. Macdonald & Mark P. Shea, "Saving Sinners and Reconciling Churches: An 
Ecumenical Meditation on Mere Christianity," in Pilgrim's Guide, 43-44. 
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argued, on the basis of practical reason-the ethical dimension of existence and the 
corresponding moral faculty of the mind. For him, the moral sphere is the proper domain 
of religion. There it reigns supreme, shielded from the findings of science."70 
Lewis makes the case for the existence of God on philosophical grounds, and 
more specifically on moral grounds: he bases his entire argument on the existence of 
Moral Law. He points out that people everywhere have standards for behavior, as 
illustrated when one person objects that another has violated one of these standards; the 
offender hardly ever rejects the standard, but instead attempts to justify the reason for 
breaking it. 71 Stephan Korner states, "Indeed, to adopt the legal metaphor which Kant 
uses in the Critique of Pure Reason, we are 'in possession' of specifically moral concepts 
and specifically moral principles. Examples would be concepts such as 'duty' and 
principles such as 'inflicting pain for the mere sake of doing so is always wrong.' About 
the fact that we have such principles there is general agreement."72 Like Lewis, Grenz 
describes Kant's "categorical imperative" as a set of "universal principles of conduct" or 
"a supreme principle of morality" 73 in which moral life consists of living by principles 
that one wishes all to follow. 74 Incidentally, this again echoes the example of Jesus, who 
simply said, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." 
While scholars debate whether Moral Law actually exists and how we can be 
certain of it, Lewis still succeeds in his plan of attack by, interestingly, appealing not 
necessarily to reason but to the human heart. After all, how many people-both children 
70 Grenz & Olson, 20'11-Century Theology, 31. 
71 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 17, 21. 
72 Komer, 127. 
73 These definitions are taken from Stanley J. Grenz, The Moral Quest: Foundations of Christian 
Ethics (Downer's Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1997), 31; and Grenz, Primer, 78. 
74 Grenz, Primer, 78. 
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and adults-have uttered the words: "That's not fair!" How many have found themselves 
to be victims of gossip, betrayal, cheating, slander, inequality and injustice? Reading the 
first few pages of Mere Christianity, the reader can already relate to occasions of Moral 
Law in action. Purtill confirms: "No matter how skeptical we are about morality in 
theory, as soon as a moral issue enters our lives we find ourselves making judgments 
about rightness and wrongness. Whether it is a public issue such as the war in Vietnam, 
Watergate, or the American hostages in Iran, or whether it is an injustice or injury of a 
personal kind-a robbery, a rape, an act of cruelty done to or by someone we know-
sooner or later something will cut through our theoretical moral skepticism or relativism 
and make us say, 'That is wrong. "'75 
Further, whether or not he is accused of oversimplifying, Lewis does reach his 
goal ofbuilding his case upon an indubitable and incorrigible foundation in the eyes of 
his readers. Holyer states that Lewis' strongest philosophical argument for Christianity is 
that he begins with premises which are "widely known to be true by both Christians and 
non-Christians, theists and non-theists, and entail conclusions which are themselves 
important Christian beliefs. Such arguments ... are claimed by some philosophers to be 
precisely what Christians need if their beliefs are to be fully rational."76 
Once this foundation is laid, Lewis moves on to the next stage. He takes Kant's 
categorical imperative one step further by pointing out that if there is a Natural or Moral 
Law, reason dictates that it cannot have been written without a writer-a Power behind 
the Moral Law. Note that he is describing a philosophical view, not a religious view, of 
that Power; he has yet to introduce any concept of God. Cunningham suggests that "Both 
75 Purtill, pp. I 7- I 8 
76 Holyer, I 50. 
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reason and morality point to the existence of God, but this says nothing about what kind 
of God he is or how he is related to the world."77 Beversluis also distinguishes between 
philosophical views of God as, for example, the force that somehow caused the universe 
to come into being, and religious views of God as the purposeful creator and redeemer, 
seeking intimacy with and adoration from his creatures. 78 
Paralleling this stage of Lewis' thought, the writings of Kant also address the 
issue of the "Something Behind" the Moral Law. In developing his argument on practical 
reason, Kant offers examples of ideas such as freedom, morality, and God as having 
objects which cannot be perceived. Komer explains: "The postulates of practical reason 
state that the Ideas of God, freedom and immortality have 'objects '-but no, of course, 
objects which can be given to perception. They are not objects in the sense of The 
Critique of Pure Reason, that is to say, manifolds of perception which have synthetic 
unity or which are instances of the schematized Categories. They are non-phenomenal 
'objects' whose existence is guaranteed only by the apprehension of the morallaw."79 
Berkhof adds, "The postulates of practical reason are final concepts, which do not 
release further possibilities for new developments from within them. They stem from the 
moral world and serve only that world."80 
Cunningham sees this stage of the argument as two-fold: "With his own peculiar 
twist, Lewis uses the moral argument to establish not merely a Lawgiver but also man's 
guilt before the Law."81 Many perhaps would stop here, having established the existence 
of a Higher Power. However, this is only stage two of Lewis' argument; it is not the end 
77 Cunningham, 173. 
78 Beversluis, 5. 
79 Komer, 164. 
80 Berkhof, 8. 
81 Cunningham, 165. 
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point. Lewis is arguing not for "mere theism" but "mere Christianity," following the 
progressive nature of his own conversion to believing in Christ as God himself. 
Finally, Lewis narrows the focus to seeing this Power that exists as the Christian 
view of God: "My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and 
unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked 
unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when 
I called it unjust?"82 Lewis saw that there is good and evil in the universe. However, 
unlike dualism, which maintains that good and evil are equal powers, Lewis saw good as 
that which stands in right relationship to the ultimate God, while evil is that which does 
not. Good, he argues, can exist for good's sake, but evil cannot exist independently, for 
evil's own sake; it can exist only as a rebellion against good. Therefore, evil is inferior to 
good. Lewis sees this as support that God, against whom good is measured and identified, 
must exist. 83 This again strikes a Kantian chord that the highest good cannot be realized 
unless God exists. 84 
The element that best ties Lewis to modernism is his connection to Kant's idea of 
practical reason-the aspect of modernism with which he was most comfortable and 
effective. Lewis' entire purpose for his argument is based upon foundationalism-"the 
view that knowledge can be justified only by finding indubitable 'foundational' beliefs 
upon which it is constructed."85 Knowing that his audience would not tolerate "The Bible 
says so" as proof of God's existence, he established a foundation for that existence by 
pointing to the evidence for a Moral Law-a universal sense of right and wrong-which 
82 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 45. 
83 Ibid., 49. 
84 Komer, 167. 
85 Murphy/McClendon, 192. 
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is something virtually all people can agree upon. Most people have been placed in a 
situation where they had to appeal to the Moral Law to attempt to correct an injustice or 
grievance. Beversluis' criticism implies that Lewis overshot the runway; however, it also 
points out clearly what Lewis had intended to do all along: establish indubitable 
foundations that all could agree upon as a basis for proving the existence of God. 
On the first axis in the Murphy-McClendon model, where would Lewis be 
placed? One reasonable position would be near Descartes-an optimistic foundationalist 
because "for him [Descartes], God guaranteed that ideas represent a real world."86 
However, another author suggests that Lewis started at the other end, pessimistic 
skepticism, and only after a harsh collision with reality did he slide toward optimistic 
foundationalism: "He began by doubting just about everything, doubting even the things 
we take for granted as everyday reality. Then World War I came along and threw him out 
of the ivory tower. Forced to spend a couple of terms in the trenches in Ypres, Lewis 
realized that some things in life are, in fact, quite real. Mud, for example-and the 
German bullet that very nearly put him out of circulation for good."87 
The Linguistic Axis 
The second Murphy-McClendon axis is linguistic in nature. Modernism asserts a 
representational theory of language-one that sees words merely as representations of 
objects.88 "Gun" has no meaning beyond the object it represents: a mechanical device, 
using a controlled explosion to discharge an object from its barrel at high speed. 
However, modern philosophers ran into trouble with words that represented things other 
86 Ibid., 193. 
87 John McTavish, "The Most Reluctant Convert in All England," Touchstone 7 (September 1989), 
44. 
88 Murphy & McClendon, 193. 
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than objects (such as ethics, duty, love), so they added an expressivist or emotivist theory 
of meaning in which language identifies the speaker's attitudes and emotions about an 
object, not simply the object itself. 89 Although the two theories are more correlative than 
polar, a person's view of the first will affect her view of the second. Therefore, this axis 
places the representational theory at one pole and an expressivist or emotivist theory at 
the other. 
While defining his terms in Mere Christianity, Lewis gives a good example of the 
difference between the two theories and hints at his preference. He points out that the 
English word "gentleman" originally meant a male person who had some land and a coat 
of arms. Over time, however, people decided that "gentleman" should be a compliment-
not an objective identifier of a man who had land and a coat of arms, but an identifier of a 
man who acted as they thought a man with land should act-that is, well-mannered. The 
problem is that there were already words to identify such men: courteous, honorable, 
brave. Now that the word "gentleman" intrudes upon the meaning of those words, there is 
no word left to describe a man who has land and a coat of arms. He distinguishes between 
the representational theory of language and the expressivist theory by saying, "When a 
word ceases to be a term of a description and becomes merely a term of praise, it no 
longer tells you facts about the object; it only tells you about the speaker's attitude to that 
object. "90 
Similarly, Lewis points out that the word "Christian" was invented simply to 
identify people in Antioch who accepted the teachings of Christ and his apostles: "There 
is no question of its being extended to those who ... were 'far closer to the spirit of Christ' 
89 Ibid., 195. 
90 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 10. 
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than the less satisfactory of the disciples. The point is ... only a question of using words so 
that we can all understand what is being said. When a man who accepts the Christian 
doctrine lives unworthily of it, it is much clearer to say that he is a bad Christian than to 
say he is not a Christian." 91 Seeking an incorrigible understanding of the word 
"Christian" and of what one is, Lewis emphasizes the representational theory of the 
meaning of language, concluding that "obviously a word which we can never apply is not 
going to be a very useful word."92 Lewis concludes that words should represent objects as 
descriptions of fact, since trying to "spiritualize" or refine a word beyond its objective, 
representational meaning actually lessens the meaning.93 Thus Lewis shows a clear 
preference for the representational theory of language. 
Another way to detect Lewis' representational preference is to note his criticism, 
or caution, toward the expressivist theory in Studies In Words, where he expresses subtle 
doubt that meaning comes from the one who expresses the words. First, he raises the 
issue of what he calls "verbicide," or the murder of words: 1) exaggeration or inflation 
(i.e. substituting tremendous for great); 2) "verbiage," by which he means "the use of a 
word as a promise to pay which is never going to be kept" (i.e.- using significant to 
mean absolute); 3) the use of a word as a "party banner" or slogan; and, perhaps the 
greatest offender, 4) "the fact that most people are obviously far more anxious to express 
their approval and disapproval of things than to describe them. "94 Hence, words lose their 
descriptive quality and increase their evaluative quality. This argument supports the idea 
of Lewis' preference for the representational theory of language. Lewis felt that, contrary 
91 Ibid., 11. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 7. 
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to postmodemism, students should share in the same exploration to attempt to find the 
origin of words for the purpose of the more accurate reading of old books, saying dryly 
that those seeking to study literature free from philology are "crying for the moon or else 
[living] a lifetime of persistent and carefully guarded delusion."95 Reading poetry with a 
non-philological method frees the mind to produce whatever meaning it happens to 
consider at the time, and thus the poem becomes the reader's and not the poet's. Lewis 
was concerned with mistranslation of a poem or text, and perhaps there is a danger. 
However, in agreement with postmodernism and its anti-metanarrative view, Lewis holds 
this opinion to be his own and not one that should be forced upon others.96 In other 
words, to each his own. 
This is not to say, however, that Lewis thought the meaning of words remains 
constant. He acknowledged that meanings do change, like a tree growing new branches 
which then grow branches of their own; however, he observed that most speakers 
"neither know or care about the tree" and use words without thinking about their 
meanings. The danger is that using words mindlessly, to mean whatever one wants them 
to mean, can result in the "dumbing down" of language.97 
Next, Lewis concedes that words and language do have emotional nuances, but he 
delineates between language that is emotional (arousing emotion) and language that is 
emotive (expressive of emotion): "We do not talk only in order to reason or to inform. 
We have to make love and quarrel, to propitiate and pardon, to rebuke, console, 
intercede, and arouse."98 However, Lewis felt the emotional meaning does not come from 
95 Ibid. 3. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., 9. 
98 Ibid., 314. 
Page 35 
the speaker, as an expressivist theorist might suggest, but indirectly from another area. 
Language-especially poetic language-does not create emotion itself; instead, it utilizes 
the imagination to create the grounds for emotion to express itself.99 He reiterates this in 
Christian Reflections: "I think that Poetic language often expresses emotion not for its 
own sake but in order to inform us about the object which aroused the emotion." 100 To 
put it another way, words stimulate emotion through imagination. 101 
All good writing instructors teach this crucial methodology: show, don't tell. 
Lewis expounds on it: 
Do you think your readers will believe you just because you say so? You 
must go quite a different way to work. By direct description, by metaphor 
and simile, by secretly evoking powerful associations, by offering the right 
stimuli to our nerves (in the right degree and the right order), and by the 
very beat and vowel-melody and length and brevity of your sentences, you 
must bring it about that we, we readers, not you, exclaim 'how 
mysterious!' or 'loathsome' or whatever it is. Let me taste for myself, and 
you'll have no need to tell me how I should react to the flavour. 102 
Here Lewis does not directly proclaim his support of the representational theory of 
language, but he does challenge the expressivist theory quite extensively and finds it 
wanting, especially in its limited ability to communicate emotion to the reader or hearer. 
Perhaps it is because ofthis understanding ofthe representational-expressivist theory of 
language that Lewis connected so completely with his readers through fiction. Combining 
Lewis' representational theory from Mere Christianity and his anti-expressivist side from 
Studies In Words puts Lewis at the representational end of the second axis in the Murphy-
McClendon model. 
99 Ibid., 317. 
100 Lewis, Christian Reflections, 132. 
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The Reductionistic Axis 
Finally, the third axis of modernism is atomism or reductionism. Reductionism 
attempts to understand reality by reducing it to its smallest parts. 103 The reductionist 
believes that everything is better understood when broken down or reduced in this way. 
In science, for instance, water is better understood if examined as a molecule of two parts 
hydrogen and one part oxygen. In religion, the gospel is better understood when reduced 
to four spiritual laws or eight irrefutable proofs. 
Reductionism can be correlated to the shift away from traditional authorities, such 
as the church, the government, and the scripture, to the authority of the individual-the 
smallest part of the whole. Murphy and McClendon write that this modern approach 
"sees the individual as prior to the community, and the community as merely a collection 
of like individuals, a mass." 104 Therefore, Murphy and McClendon add a reductionistic 
axis, completing their three-dimensional model of modernism. At one pole of the 
reductionistic axis is individualism: only the individual can know what is real, and is 
therefore given the power to decide for him or herself. The opposite pole is collectivism, 
which sees all individuals as interchangeable or expendable. The way that this is 
reconciled with the elevated view of the individual is that "Both collectivists and 
individualists base their arguments on metaphysical positions, the former claiming that 
social wholes, and not their human elements, are the true historical individuals."105 
To define Lewis within this reductionistic axis, the question to ask might be: from 
where or whom does Lewis receive his authority? Is it from the scripture, the church, or 
the individual rational will? In other words, does authority come from the individual or 
103 Murphy/McClendon, 192. 
104 Ibid. 
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the collective? Even then, this question is not as easy to answer as it might seem. The 
paradox of Lewis requires a complex answer. 
Looking back on himself as an atheist, Lewis remembers a contempt for all 
authority, therefore giving authority only to himself and his own rational will: "But, of 
course, what mattered most of all was my deep-seated hatred of authority, my monstrous 
individualism, my lawlessness. No word in my vocabulary expressed deeper hatred than 
the word Interference. But Christianity placed at the center what seemed to me a 
transcendental Interferer."106 Interestingly, however, he also accepted authority from 
poetry. When the poet Yeats mentioned "ever living ones" as ifhe was certain they 
existed, and certain that contact between their world and this one was possible, Lewis 
was surprised and perplexed: "Here was a pretty kettle of fish. You will understand that 
my rationalism was inevitably based on what I believed to be the findings of the sciences, 
and those findings, not being a scientist, I had to take on trust-in fact, on authority. 
Well, here was an opposite authority. If he had been a Christian I should have discounted 
his testimony, for I thought I had the Christians 'placed' and disposed of forever." 107 
For the first time, Lewis realized that spirituality was not synonymous with 
Christianity, and it was this realization that led him into spiritualism, theosophy, 
pantheism and even the occult. However, it also served as the starting point in his journey 
toward theism and eventually to Christ. When his evolution was complete, Lewis 
continued in many ways to rely on the authority of his own individualism-either his 
rational will or his imagination; but he now acknowledged authority from a higher source 
106 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 172. 
107 Ibid., 175. 
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as well. To Lewis the Christian, authority came from many sources, yet all of them 
pointed to God. 
He struggled, however, with giving authority to the Church-in his case, the 
Anglican Church-even after he became a Christian. He disliked the crowds, the noise, 
the "perpetual arranging and organizing," and especially the organ, 108 not to mention his 
least-favorite thing of all: "What I, like many other laymen, chiefly desire in church are 
fewer, better, and shorter hymns; especially fewer." 109 John McTavish writes: "Lewis 
started going to church. He sat through sermons and sang ear-grating hymns and did what 
he could to bring his fuzzy religion down to earth. Even parish life, however, even 
worship, didn't help so much as his trusty old intellect. Once again, then, Lewis' razor-
sharp mind came to the rescue, slicing through all the religious verbiage until everything 
narrowed to a choice between Hinduism and Christianity."110 
He found religion at its richest in small groups with "good men praying alone and 
meeting by twos and threes to talk of spiritual matters." 111 Of the church, he wrote, "Thus 
my churchgoing was a merely symbolical and provisional practice. If it in fact helped to 
move me in the Christian direction, I was and am unaware ofthis." 112 Further, his 
marriage to Joy Davidman Gresham created quite a controversy in the church when a 
bishop refused to marry them because Gresham was divorced. Lewis' tensions with the 
church indicate that he rejected authority from the church, placing it instead with the 
individual. For much of his Christian life, as in his early years, Lewis listened to the 
authority of his own individual will. 
108 Ibid., 234 
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Authority also came from the Bible for Lewis, although, writing for the 
unchurched, he rarely included scripture in his apologetic discussions. He read primarily 
out of the New Testament and rarely out ofthe Old. In fact, his only commentary on the 
Old Testament is Reflections on the Psalms. But he takes issue with the fundamentalist 
view of the authority of scripture, specifically the issue of inerrancy. Approaching the 
Bible as a literary critic, he regards it not as "impeccable science or history" but rather as 
"an untidy and leaky vehicle." 113 He recognizes narrative from history and concludes, for 
example, that Job was not an actual living person and that the creation account is poetic 
rather than historical. 114 The Bible, Lewis maintains, "contains good literature and bad 
literature. " 115 
However, in the stories, poems and histories of the Bible, and even in the surface 
imperfections and contradictions, Lewis senses its realness and authority. Though 
inerrantists may cringe at them, Lewis' literary criticisms of scripture do not reduce it to 
bad literature or something to be discarded, but instead offer proof that scripture is a 
narrative account of God: "If ever a myth had become fact, had been incarnated, it would 
be just like this." 116 To squeeze the scripture into either an inerrantist' sora literary 
critic's view is to squelch its authority and turn it into just another (ordinary) classic. It is 
in the sloppy realness of its pages that the narrative's main character is seen and 
understood. 
Scripture is not the Word of God in the literal sense of a book written perfectly by 
a perfect God. Instead, Lewis writes, "It carries the Word of God; and we receive that 
113 C. S. Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1958), 112. 
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word from it not by using it as an encyclopedia or an encyclical but by steeping ourselves 
in its tone or temper and so learning its overall message." 117 
Whether as a literary scholar, a layman, an apologist, a lecturer, or a broadcaster, 
Lewis sees something sacred and holy in the scriptures. He holds it as a book like none 
other and states that no other book makes the kind of claims about itself as does the 
Bible. Compare this statement from Lewis the literary critic: 
It is, if you like to put it that way, not merely a sacred book but a book so 
remorselessly and continuously sacred that it does not invite, it excludes or 
repels, the merely aesthetic approach. You can read it as literature only by 
a tour de force. You are cutting the wood against the grain, using the tool 
for a purpose it was not intended to serve. It demands incessantly to be 
taken on its own terms: it will not continue to give literary delight very 
long except to those who go to it for something quite different. 118 
to this statement from Lewis the Christian layman: 
We may observe that the teaching of Our Lord Himself, in which there is 
no imperfection, is not given us in that cut-and-dried, fool-proof, 
systematic fashion we might have expected or desired. He wrote no book. 
We have only reported sayings, most of them uttered in answer to 
questions, shaped in some degree by their context. And when we have 
collected them all we cannot reduce them to a system. He preaches but He 
does not lecture. He uses paradox, proverb, exaggeration, parable, irony; 
even the "wisecrack". He utters maxims which, like popular proverbs, if 
rigorously taken, may seem to contradict one another. His teaching 
therefore cannot be grasped by the intellect alone, cannot be "got up" as if 
it were a "subject". If we try to do that with it, we shall find Him the most 
elusive of teachers. He hardly ever gave a straight answer to a straight 
question. He will not be, in the way we want, "pinned down". The attempt 
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Given the tension he experienced with authority and the Church of England 
during his Christian years and his high regard for the scripture, particularly as the 
mysterious Word of God, Lewis gets his authority from scripture and, even more so, from 
117 Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, 112. 
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his own interpretation of scripture. The Church of England and its traditions did little for 
his discipleship, so many of his views of scripture came primarily out of his own study 
(and perhaps, to some degree, out of discussions with peers around him such as the 
Inklings). 
Lewis constantly qualified his apologetics by insisting he was a layman, not a 
theologian. Statements such as this might be taken to mean that Lewis did get authority 
from others, but it might also confirm that although there are other, more qualified 
exegetes of scriptures, he continues to receive his authority from his own interpretations. 
Lewis' reliance on the authority of individual interpretation of Scriptures, as well 
as his occasional expressed suspicions of the "collective" (in reference to socialism), 
would place Lewis on the reductionistic axis of the Murphy-McClendon model toward 
the individualism pole. Even the manner in which he presents his apologetics is designed 
to appeal to the individual rational will. The argument is given, and one is left to draw 
one's own conclusions, right or wrong. In fact, Lewis goes even further in supporting the 
authority of the individual's own process: he admonishes others to allow the individual 
conclusions to be reached and not to interfere with the individual's process. He writes, 
"When you have reached your own room be kind to those who have chosen different 
doors and to those who are still in the hall. If they are wrong they need your prayers all 
the more; and if they are your enemies, then you are under orders to pray for them. That 
is one of the rules common to the whole house." 120 
For all these reasons, C. S. Lewis appeals to the modern mind and is sometimes 
even mistaken for a pure modernist by scholars. When one filters Lewis through the 
modern grid, he can pass the test and fit snugly within that model. He is an optimistic 
120 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 12. 
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foundationalist, standing on the shoulders of Immanuel Kant; he supports the 
representational theory of language; and he shows his confidence in the individual's 
ability to know what is real by appealing directly to personal reason and logic. 
Of the three axes in the Murphy-McClendon model, therefore, his position on the 
epistemological axis (as an optimistic foundationalist) is perhaps the one which identifies 
him most strongly with modernists and causes them-whether critics or supporters-to 
include him in their camp. His position on the remaining two axes-the linguistic axis (as 
a representational theorist) and the reductionistic axis (as an individualist)-also show 
accurately how Lewis fits into modernity. However, as a shift takes place from Lewis the 
Modernist to Lewis the Postmodernist, conflicts arise with all three axes, but especially 
the latter two. 
The point is not to establish that Lewis was a modernist, but to establish and 
understand his appeal to modernists. He certainly had a modernist side. However, at the 
same time he was highly critical of modernist theologians, who, he says, "by God's 
grace, become fewer every day,"121 and even called the extreme modernist an "infidel in 
all but name." 122 Again, in The Great Divorce he emphasizes their wrong-headedness 
through a modernist character, a Ghost so set on seeking truth through rational inquiry 
that he cannot accept the existence of God; he ultimately turns away from the threshold 
of heaven. 123 
From modernism to postmodernism, the changing worldview has cast a different 
shaft of light on previously-held perspectives, including perspectives on Lewis. Yet the 
shift only illuminates new delights in his work. Modernism has faded, but Lewis remains 
121 C. S. Lewis, The Grand Miracle (New York, NY: Ballentine Books, 1970), 38. 
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as golden, if not more golden, than ever. How have the works of C. S. Lewis managed to 
shine so gracefully in the new postmodem milieu, when other works from his era have 
long since fallen out of print? 
The Postmodern Lewis 
George Barna implies that Generation X, also known as the Baby Busters (those 
born between 1965 and 1985), is the first generation to live entirely within a postmodem 
worldview and notes the challenges this new worldview brings: "With most Busters 
rejecting notions such as the uniqueness of Christianity, the existence of absolute moral 
truth, and the authority of the Bible, there are virtually no restrictions left in place to limit 
or guide their thinking about proper personal or corporate spiritual development." 124 
Postmodemism is a difficult beast to cage; indeed, it covers many philosophies, 
ideas and theories, and any attempt to define it precisely is sure to lead to frustration. It is 
more abstract than modernism and resists the clean categorizations that are the very soul 
of modernism. Murphy and McClendon, after creating their three-dimensional, three-axes 
model of modernism, go on to define postmodemism as "any mode ofthought that 
departs from the three modern axes." 125 In other words, postmodernism is anything 
besides the three modem axes or anything that might appear in other dimensions as well. 
There has been a misconception that postmodernism is a new phenomenon of the 
late twentieth century. This may be explained in part by two important events in 1951: 
publication of a significant article by W. V. 0. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 
which questioned foundationalist bases for knowledge; and the death of Ludwig 
124 George Barna, The Second Coming of the Church, (Nashville: Word, 1998), 71. 
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Wittgenstein, whose influential postmodern works on language philosophy were 
published posthumously. 126 
However, the earliest signs ofpostmodernism appeared during the Enlightenment 
with the rise of Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900), the "patron saint" of postmodernism. 127 
Nietzsche became the greatest foe of the Enlightenment, arguing that there is no "true 
world" and that no one can really know truth, in the modernist sense. This made 
Nietzsche a nihilist, seeing truth more as a function of the internal workings of language 
itself than as an external reality. 128 
Nietzsche also rejected the Enlightenment's construction of concepts, claiming 
that this led to generalizations which missed the point that no two things or occurrences 
are identical. For example, Nietzsche saw the Enlightenment's concept of a leaf as a 
falsification of the leafs reality. If one looks closely at two leaves that have been lumped 
into the same category, as Nietzsche contends, they are in fact very different. 129 To miss 
these distinctions by constructing a category is, in a sense, to deny the leafs true reality. 
Following Nietzsche, postmodernism picked up steam as the 20th century began. Later, 
Jean-Franvois Lyotard (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge) and Michel 
Foucault (The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, and The Order 
of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences), among others, took the baton in the 
latter 20th century. 
126 Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern 
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Cahoone sketches a timeline ofthe spread ofpostmodernity in western society. In 
191 7, German philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz coined the term "postmodern" to describe 
the nihilism he observed all around him. In the 1930s, Federico de Onis, Bernard Iddings 
Bell, and Arnold Toynbee used it to describe, respectively, the backlash against 
modernism in literature, the failure of modernism in the realm of religion, and the 
phenomenon of the growing working classes surpassing the capitalists in social 
significance. By the 1970s and 80s, it described the reaction against modernism in 
architecture, philosophy, and even the social and natural sciences, and by the 1990s it 
completely infused pop culture and media. 130 
Although postmodernism cannot be clearly defined, Cahoone distinguishes it 
from modernism in five broad areas: presentation versus representation, origin versus 
phenomena, unity versus plurality, transcendence versus immanence, and constitutive 
otherness. 
Presentation indicates the presence of an object or experience, which in modernity 
is considered more reliable than something merely represented by thought or language. 
Conversely, representation implies that the thing in question is not truly present, but only 
a representation of it-which postmodernity sometimes views as more reliable than its 
actual presence: "It [postmodern representationalism] denies that anything is 
'immediately present' ... .In some cases, it argues that presentation actually presupposes 
representation." 131 Taken to this extreme, representationalism rejects the idea that there is 
any objective reality and favors only the subjective representation of what is real. It 
13
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should be noted that this postmodern idea of "representation" is not to be confused with 
modernism's representational theory of language. 
While there is a place in Christianity for objective discovery and apologetics, this 
representational element of postmodernism should, and probably will, force apologetics 
back into its rightful place as one of many means of seeking truth and shift emphasis 
toward wrestling with the deep, unresolved mysteries of God. Stanley Grenz suggests that 
" ... we cannot simply collapse truth into the categories of rational certainty that typify 
modernity. Rather, in understanding and articulating the Christian faith, we must make 
room for the concept of 'mystery'-not as an irrational complement to the rational but as 
a reminder that the fundamental reality of God transcends human rationality."132 
The second concept, origin, has to do with the source-the ultimate foundation. 
Modernism interests itself in the source ofthe thing in question. In modernity, the aim of 
rational inquiry is to find a common indubitable belief, or foundation, upon which all can 
agree, thereby arriving at foundational truth. Cahoone claims that postmodernism, on the 
other hand, doubts that it is possible to discover the origins or foundations of anything, 
and even doubts that they exist; indeed, if they do exist, they are of no consequence. 
Instead, postmodernism takes things at "face value," seeing the surface of things-
phenomena-as requiring no reference to a deeper meaning. Further, in postmodern 
literary criticism, the story is the thing-not the author's intentions or meanings, which 
are unknowable. 133 It should be noted that this view that the story stands on its own 
authority represents a significant shift away from modernity's emphasis on origins, 
observations, and empirical proofs to postmodernity's emphasis on personal narrative. 
132 Grenz., Primer, 170. 
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Third, postmodernism "tries to show that what others have regarded as a unity, a 
single, integral existence or concept, is plural," writes Cahoone. "Everything is 
constituted by relations to other things, hence nothing is simple, immediate, or totally 
present, and no analysis of anything can be complete or final .... [Even] the human self is 
not a simple unity ... .It would be more true to say I have selves, than a self." 134 
Surprisingly, this postmodern concept of plurality is partially based in modern 
structuralism, which perceived that-for example-a culture, while a unity, is also a 
network of elements defined in relation to one another. 135 
Transcendence, the fourth concept, asserts the existence of societal and natural 
values which are above society and nature. In other words, there is such a thing as true 
goodness, or nobility, or courage. Postmodernism rebuts this idea by saying that these 
norms or values are not transcendent-that is, existing independently of the culture or 
processes they prescribe-but immanent-that is, inherent within those cultures and 
processes. The postmodern sees every ideal as merely a product of that ideal's own time 
and culture, created for particular purposes in a particular context. 136 There is no 
standard-such as, perhaps, Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative or even Lewis' 
Moral Law-that transcends space and time. It seems that relativism develops out of this 
rejection oftranscendence and idealism. 
The first four concepts are negative reactions against aspects of modernism; the 
fifth, constitutive otherness, is a positive. Postmodernism sees that elements of a unit 
maintain unity through an active exclusion of other possible elements. Obvious examples 
are: white people maintain their unity by excluding nonwhites; the royal family maintains 
134 Ibid. 
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its unity by excluding non-royals. In linguistics and philosophy, a language such as 
Portuguese maintains its unity or cohesion by being "not" Swedish and "not" Mandarin; a 
philosophy such as capitalism maintains cohesion by being "not" communism and "not" 
socialism. Apparent unities are "constituted by repressing their ... relations to others." 137 
Postmodemism seeks to include the excluded and demarginalize the marginalized-for 
example, in literary criticism, by sometimes deliberately ignoring well-known themes to 
emphasize obscure or even nonexistent ones. 138 Likewise, postmodem theology splinters 
into various fragments-feminist theology, African-American theology, Native American 
theology-in an attempt to avoid repression or exclusion of"other," previously 
marginalized groups. 
To understand Lewis' appeal to the postmodern, a somewhat different approach 
will be used than was applied to modernism. Plugging Lewis into an existing model is 
much less clear-cut and even less desirable when it comes to postmodernism. First, a 
major distinction of postmodernism is its rejection of modern constructions. 
Postmodernism is defined differently by different people; it is nearly impossible to create 
a complete definition or model of this worldview. Second, if a postmodern model could 
be successfully constructed, Lewis would not fit as neatly within it as he did in the 
modern model. 
For example, postmodernism criticizes presentation in favor of representation. 
On one hand, Lewis argues against this by stating: "Unless there is some objective 
standard of good, over-arching Germans, Japanese and ourselves alike whether any of us 
obey it or no, then of course the Germans are as competent to create their ideology as we 
137 Ibid., 16. 
138 Ibid. 
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are to create ours."139 In other words, how can the subjective moral philosophy of the 
English be considered superior to that of the Third Reich? Yet there is a sense that it is. 
Therefore, Lewis insists that an objective standard does exist. 
On the other hand, Lewis makes himself quite comfortable with the postmodem 
idea of representation in The Screwtape Letters. Using a bit of subjectivity himself, Lewis 
represents data through a reality modified by the thought and language of a demon, 
shining it through a unique lens to communicate theology in a creative manner which 
modernism would not allow. When the Letters were first published in an Anglican 
newspaper, the Guardian, some readers had such difficulty adjusting to this use of 
language that one cleric, believing Lewis to be advocating rather than merely 
representing evil, wrote to cancel his subscription. 
To further explore Lewis' appeal to the postmodern, one must understand several 
characteristics that appear to run throughout all the different areas of postmodern studies. 
Numerous facets oftwo primary characteristics ofpostmodernism will be examined: anti-
foundationalism and use of narrative. 
Anti-Foundationalism 
Perhaps the strongest characteristic of postmodernism is its vehement rejection of 
first-principle foundations-that is, the idea that any theory or proposition can be stripped 
down to its most foundational element or elements to determine their validity, which in 
turn determines the validity of the entire proposition. Postmodernism contends that there 
is nothing truly knowable, nor are there any indubitable foundations which, once 
"proven," may be relied upon as a basis for belief. 
139 Lewis, Christian Reflections, 73. 
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After earlier showing Lewis to be a foundationalist, delving into this area might 
appear contradictory. It cannot be stated that Lewis was an anti-foundationalist, 
considering that Mere Christianity is based upon a foundation of Moral Law, and that he 
spent much of his earlier years as a scholar defending Christianity by use of 
foundationalism. In the same book, however, he states that there are questions "to which I 
may never know the answer: if I asked them, even in a better world, I might be answered 
as a far greater questioner was answered: 'What is that to thee? Follow thou Me." 140 This 
statement alludes to meaning that runs far deeper in significance than supposedly fixed 
propositional truths. 
Later in his career, however, Lewis seemed to seek something far deeper than 
apologetics. He began not only to question foundations but also to doubt that 
modernism's epistemological foundationalism was a perfectly reliable highway to truth. 
While he cannot be described as totally anti-foundational, through this shift Lewis began 
to show hints of anti-foundationalism. These are most notable in the changes he 
experienced between his two books on suffering, in his anti-scientism, and in his lifelong 
search for Joy. 
The Collapse of Foundations 
In 1940, nearly twenty years before he had lost or even met his wife, Lewis 
published The Problem of Pain, an attempt to take a reasonable approach to the issue of 
suffering by tackling its central dilemma: "If God were good, He would wish to make His 
creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He would be able to do what he 
wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks either the goodness, or 
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power, or both."141 Lewis labels these two apparently irreconcilable qualities "Divine 
Omnipotence" and "Divine Goodness." 
Lewis' premise concerning divine omnipotence begins with gaining a more 
accurate understanding of the word "impossible." The reader is reminded by Lewis that 
the word is usually followed by an explicit or implicit "unless," indicating that an 
impossibility is, in fact, a possibility with help. 142 For example, A is impossible unless B 
happens. There are however things which are impossible "under all conditions"-
intrinsic impossibilities which are not things but nonentities. These impossibilities are 
often created by mixing vastly different and sometimes opposite propositions -the 
"apples and oranges" problem-in an attempt to disprove something. Thus, when a 
question is asked: if God can both create anything and do anything, can he create a 
boulder so heavy that he cannot lift it? Lewis calls this kind of argument "self-
contradictory" and says that in no way can such an argument be used to analyze the 
attributes or capabilities of God: "His Omnipotence means power to do all that is 
intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to 
Him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power ... .It is no more possible for God 
than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive 
alternatives; not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains 
nonsense even when we talk it about God." 143 
Next, the misunderstanding of "Divine Goodness," according to Lewis, is rooted 
in-again-an inaccurate word definition. Lewis notes that the "goodness" of God these 
days is usually to means "lovingness" and thus "kindness," by which is really meant a 
141 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1962), 26. 
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sort of grandfatherly benevolence that desires to see people enjoying themselves. 144 
However, Lewis questions the leap from goodness to kindness. After all, does not the 
Lord rebuke and discipline those he loves, and cannot that rebuke be seen as loving, even 
if not kind in the traditional sense? 
In A Horse and His Boy, the unrecognized Asian terrorizes Aravis and Shasta 
from behind, chasing their horses and tearing open Aravis' back with his claws. But this 
is a two-fold demonstration oflove to Aravis and her friends, as Asian later explains: 
only terror could give the exhausted horses enough speed to complete their life-or-death 
mission on time, and Aravis also needed to learn the pain she had inflicted unknowingly 
on others. 145 Aravis' wound was not an act ofhatred or anger, but one given by a loving 
figure in the spirit of discipline, for the growth and highest benefit of the beloved. Surely, 
however, this could not be seen as kindness. Love can, in fact, sometimes seem extremely 
unkind. 
"If God is Love, He is, by definition, something more than mere kindness," 
explains Lewis. "And it appears, from all the records, that though He has often rebuked 
us and condemned us, He has never regarded us with contempt. He has paid us the 
intolerable compliment of loving us, in the deepest, most tragic, most inexorable 
sense." 146 
Lewis contends that the Divine definition of "goodness" is more complete and 
mature than the human one-for, he argues, the creature cannot have a more accurate 
view of goodness than does the Creator: 
144 Ibid., 39-40. 
145 C. S. Lewis, A Horse and His Boy (New York: NY: Harper Collins, 1954), 152-154,216 
146 Lewis, The Problem of Pain, 41. 
Page 53 
The problem of reconciling human suffering with the existence of a God 
who loves, is only insoluble so long as we attach a trivial meaning to the 
word 'love,' and look on things as if man were the centre ofthem. Man is 
not the centre. God does not exist for the sake of man. Man does not exist 
for his own sake .... We were made not primarily that we may love God 
(though we were made for that too) but that God may love us, that we may 
become objects in which the Divine love may rest "well pleased" ... 
. . . Divine goodness, therefore, does not mean the excluding of pain and 
suffering, but a laboring to mold the beloved into something lovable. 
Therefore the purpose of a God who is Love is not to be content with 
humanity as it is, but to shape it into something with which he is "well-
pleased."147 
So Lewis concludes that the presence of suffering in the face of a "good" and 
"almighty" God neither contradicts logic, nor disproves the existence of an omnipotent 
God: "We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this 
abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft 
as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to 
set up in it insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were 
impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void." 148 
The Problem of Pain is Lewis' rational attempt to explain pain to a suffering 
world. However, it is incomplete without his second work about pain. After the death of 
his wife of four years, Lewis wrote a journal of what he thought and felt in his grief, first 
published in 1961 under the pseudonym N. W. Clerk as A Grief Observed. There is no 
clearer picture of an open, vulnerable and emotional C. S. Lewis. Whereas The Problem 
of Pain was almost an academic exercise in rational objectivity, A Grief Observed was an 
emotive, subjective outpouring of grief. Robert Walter Wall notes that many Lewisian 
147 Ibid., 48, 42. 
148 Ibid., 33. 
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scholars "start and stop" with the well-reasoned, theological offering of the first book. 
However, the latter book rounds out the issue: 
The questions of Pain are 'legal' questions, so that suffering is best 
subdued by a system of cogent (and perhaps accurate) propositions of 
theology and philosophy with their logical conclusions. Yet when Lewis 
actually lives within the context of suffering and experiences pain first-
hand, as Grief describes, he calls into question the legitimacy of and then 
finally extends those very beliefs developed in Pain. Two different 
contexts, two different treatments of the problem are brought into a 
profound dialectic that provides the reader with a more comprehensive 
picture of what is really at stake in human suffering. 149 
Clearly, The Problem of Pain presents an understanding of suffering for the modernist 
mind; however, A Grief Observed presents that understanding to the postmodem. It is 
here that the reader is introduced more fully to the mystical side of C. S. Lewis; it is here 
that the once-clear foundations of Lewis' own theology of suffering begin to crumble. 
Lewis discovers during this journey that sound reason and unshakeable propositions-
even true ones-are not enough. 
Biographers have suggested that Lewis' controversial four-year marriage to Joy 
Davidman Gresham before her death were among Lewis' happiest years. 150 The couple 
were married in Joy's hospital room by a sympathetic minister who performed the 
ceremony despite the objections of the Anglican Church, since Joy was a divorcee. The 
reason for the marriage was ostensibly so that Joy could remain in Britain after her visa 
expired. 151 However, Lewis grew exceptionally close to Joy and her sons during the next 
149 Robert Walter Wall, "The Probem of Observed Pain: A Study of C. S. Lewis on Suffering," 
Journal of the Evangelica!Theological Society 26, no. 4 (December 1983): 444. 
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four years and was shattered when she succumbed to cancer in 1960. Joy's son wrote that 
Lewis was never quite the same following her death. 152 
Lewis is brutally honest in A Grief Observed. The foundations of Divine 
Omnipotence versus Divine Goodness crumble in the face ofhis suffering. Though still 
seeing God as omnipotent, he could not understand why an all-powerful God would 
remove himself from the sufferer's perception. He found himself asking the same 
questions that Pain attempted to answer: 
Meanwhile, where is God? This is one of the most disquieting symptoms. 
When you are happy, so happy that you have no sense of needing Him, so 
happy that you are tempted to feel His claims upon you as an interruption, 
if you remember yourself and turn to Him with gratitude and praise, you 
will be-or so it feels-welcomed with open arms. But go to Him when 
your need is desperate, when all other help is vain, and what do you find? 
A door slammed in your face, and a sound of bolting and double bolting 
on the inside. After that, silence .... Why is He so present a commander in 
our time of prosperity and so very absent a help in time oftrouble?153 
Lewis went beyond questions to accusations. In his torment he lashed out at God, 
calling him a "Cosmic Sadist," characterized by unreasonableness, vanity, vindictiveness, 
injustice, and cruelty. 154 He went on to write: "If God's goodness is inconsistent with 
hurting us, then either God is not good or there is no God: for in the only life we know 
He hurts us beyond our worst fears and beyond all we can imagine. If it is consistent with 
hurting us, then He may hurt us after death as unendurably as before it." 155 
A foundationalist like Beversluis would see these statements as contradictory. 
After all, how could God be perfectly good, according to Moral Law, yet also cruel and 
sadistic at the same time? 
152 Douglas H. Gresham, Lenten Lands (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1988), 130. 
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154 Ibid., 35, 37. 
155 Ibid., 31. 
Page 56 
Lewis accepted foundationalism, but he also understood that spirituality went 
beyond reason and the mind. As he later wrote, spiritual intimacy with God came through 
other sources, even suffering: "God has not been trying to experiment on my faith or love 
in order to find out their quality. He knew it already. It was I who didn't. In this trial He 
makes us occupy the dock, the witness box, and the bench all at once. He always knew 
that my temple was a house of cards. His only way of making me realize the fact was to 
knock it down."156 
Although Lewis believed in foundations, he realized that there was much more to 
God and the Christian life than finding out what those foundations are. There is a place 
for foundations, Lewis believed, but that place has its limits. Similarly, postmodemism in 
general rejects the rationalistic foundationalism and empirical truth of modernism; 
however, this does not deny the existence of truth altogether. Truth comes from other 
means. Each of Lewis' two books on suffering is incomplete without the other. The 
foundations established in the first do maintain logical validity, but even their validity is 
meaningless without the conflicts and mysteries of the second. 
Anti-Scientism 
Perhaps the strongest characteristic of the postmodern world view is its criticism 
of scientism. Rejecting the authority of science as self-evident, postmodernity accepts 
instead the authority of narrative and experience. Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard defines 
modernism as "any science that legitimates itself with ... an explicit appeal to some grand 
narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation 
156 Ibid., 61. 
Page 57 
of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth," and postmodernism simply 
as "incredulity toward metanarratives. " 157 
Postmodernism reacts strongly against scientific propositions and the belief in the 
existence of valid, universal claims. It elevates diversity and finds itself somewhat 
intolerant of the idea of a single unity. Where science has gone wrong, Lyotard contends, 
is in the misconception that scientific truisms somehow represent the totality of 
knowledge. 158 In fact, Lyotard argues that knowledge is categorically different from 
science, but is something higher: "Knowledge in general cannot be reduced to science, 
nor even to learning. Learning is the set of statements which, to the exclusion of all other 
statements, denote or describe objects and may be declared true or false. Science is a 
subset of learning." 159 Lyotard calls narration the "quintessential form of customary 
knowledge." 160 
Scientism has reversed the roles between science and narrative and established 
itself as the sole grid through which all knowledge is legitimized. Lyotard responds: 
"What I say is true because I prove that it is-but what proof is there that my proof is 
true?"161 In science, however, that proof comes from the scientist (the sender) finding 
another (the addressee) to validate the argument, who then in turn becomes the sender to 
another. Without this partnership between sender and addressee, verification of the 
scientist's statements is impossible. Lyotard suggests, "The truth of the statement and the 
competence of its sender are thus subject to the collective approval of a group of persons 
157 Jean-Frans;ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Briand Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiii and xxiv. 
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who are competent on an equal basis. Equals are needed and must be created." 162 Note, 
however, Lyotard's description ofthe transmission of narrative: "the narrator's only 
claim to competence for telling the story is the fact that he has heard it himself. The 
current narratee gains potential access to the same authority simply by listening."163 In 
other words, science must use narrative to legitimate itself, transmitting a statement of 
truth from the sender to an addressee who in turn becomes an authority merely by telling 
the story. Lyotard explains that knowledge "includes notions of 'know-how,' 'knowing 
how to live', 'how to listen', etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes 
beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the 
determination and application of criteria of efficiency, of justice and/or happiness, of the 
beauty of a sound or color, etc." 164 
Lewis seems to echo Lyotard's argument against scientism and frequently targets 
it in both essays and fiction. 165 His small tolerance for scientism as a metanarrative is 
illustrated with great humor and clarity through Weston, the scientist caricature in the 
Space Trilogy. Evidently the name "Weston" represents western civilization and some of 
its many flaws: in the first book, western rationalism, and in the second, western 
materialism, as the Un-Man tempts the Lady of Perelandra with "beautiful things."166 
Weston represents all that Lewis finds wrong with scientism; he worships empirical data 
and sees the survival of the human race as completely contingent upon the advancement 
of science. Consider his arrogant justification of his actions to Oyarsa, a type of God-
figure: 
162 Ibid., 24. 
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"To you I may seem a vulgar robber, but I bear on my shoulders the destiny of the 
human race. Your tribal life with its stone-age weapons and bee-hive huts, its primitive 
coracles and elementary social structure, has nothing to compare with our civilization-
with our science, medicine and law, our armies, our architecture, our commerce, and our 
transport system which is rapidly annihilating space and time. Our right to supercede you 
is the right of the higher over the lower."167 
In taking this stance, Weston completely fails to comprehend that the inhabitants 
of the planet have something important to say. Ransom, however, lives with them and 
learns their language and culture. Only then does he truly understand the purpose of 
Oyarsa's calling upon him. In translating the narrative of the planet from Oyarsa (the 
sender), Ransom (the addressee) becomes the sender to Weston and Devine and thus 
becomes the authority. 168 This pattern parallels the postmodern idea that knowledge and 
authority come through narrative. 
By contrast, Lewis exposes the limits of science and its primary tool of 
observation. The scientists, hearing Oyarsa's voice and not knowing its source, observe a 
nearby hross with closed eyes and hypothesize that it must be a witch doctor in a trance, 
performing ventriloquism to create the voice. Weston then makes a ridiculous speech 
designed to intimidate the hross, complete with wild threats and hilarious posturing. With 
dry wit, Lewis observes: "On Weston's hypothesis his action ought to have been 
impressive. Unfortunately for him, no one else shared his theory of the elderly hross' s 
behavior." 169 The hross turns out to be asleep. Weston's misplaced trust in science, and 
167 C. S. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1938), 135. 
168 Ibid., 134-141. 
169 Ibid., 127. 
Page 58 
who are competent on an equal basis. Equals are needed and must be created."162 Note, 
however, Lyotard's description ofthe transmission of narrative: "the narrator's only 
claim to competence for telling the story is the fact that he has heard it himself. The 
current narratee gains potential access to the same authority simply by listening."163 In 
other words, science must use narrative to legitimate itself, transmitting a statement of 
truth from the sender to an addressee who in turn becomes an authority merely by telling 
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beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the 
determination and application of criteria of efficiency, of justice and/or happiness, of the 
beauty of a sound or color, etc." 164 
Lewis seems to echo Lyotard's argument against scientism and frequently targets 
it in both essays and fiction. 165 His small tolerance for scientism as a metanarrative is 
illustrated with great humor and clarity through Weston, the scientist caricature in the 
Space Trilogy. Evidently the name "Weston" represents western civilization and some of 
its many flaws: in the first book, western rationalism, and in the second, western 
materialism, as the Un-Man tempts the Lady ofPerelandra with "beautiful things."166 
Weston represents all that Lewis finds wrong with scientism; he worships empirical data 
and sees the survival of the human race as completely contingent upon the advancement 
of science. Consider his arrogant justification of his actions to Oyarsa, a type of God-
figure: 
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"To you I may seem a vulgar robber, but I bear on my shoulders the destiny of the 
human race. Your tribal life with its stone-age weapons and bee-hive huts, its primitive 
coracles and elementary social structure, has nothing to compare with our civilization-
with our science, medicine and law, our armies, our architecture, our commerce, and our 
transport system which is rapidly annihilating space and time. Our right to supercede you 
is the right of the higher over the lower." 167 
In taking this stance, Weston completely fails to comprehend that the inhabitants 
of the planet have something important to say. Ransom, however, lives with them and 
learns their language and culture. Only then does he truly understand the purpose of 
Oyarsa's calling upon him. In translating the narrative of the planet from Oyarsa (the 
sender), Ransom (the addressee) becomes the sender to Weston and Devine and thus 
becomes the authority. 168 This pattern parallels the postmodern idea that knowledge and 
authority come through narrative. 
By contrast, Lewis exposes the limits of science and its primary tool of 
observation. The scientists, hearing Oyarsa' s voice and not knowing its source, observe a 
nearby hross with closed eyes and hypothesize that it must be a witch doctor in a trance, 
performing ventriloquism to create the voice. Weston then makes a ridiculous speech 
designed to intimidate the hross, complete with wild threats and hilarious posturing. With 
dry wit, Lewis observes: "On Weston's hypothesis his action ought to have been 
impressive. Unfortunately for him, no one else shared his theory of the elderly hross' s 
behavior." 169 The hross turns out to be asleep. Weston's misplaced trust in science, and 
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in his own powers of observation and deduction, makes him the laughingstock of all the 
onlookers. In this way Lewis clearly shows the limitations of scientism. 
In Perelandra, Weston goes beyond proclaiming science as the hope and 
salvation of humanity to deifying science as the totality of knowledge. "In so far as I am 
the conductor of the central forward pressure of the universe, I am it. Do you see, you 
timid, scruple-mongering fool? I am the universe. I, Weston, am your God and your 
Devil." 170 Interestingly, the moment Weston states this, he finds himself physically used 
as a tool of evil, transformed into the demonic Un-Man. 
In fact, much of Lewis' mistrust of scientism and its conquest appears almost 
more prophetic than critical when, for example, Feverstone in That Hideous Strength 
exalts science as the savior of humanity: "If Science is really given a free hand it can now 
take over the human race and re-condition it: make man a really efficient animal. If it 
doesn't-well, we're done." 171 
Lewis' anti-scientism zeal shows through his essays as well. In The Abolition of 
Man, he expresses concern with the conquest of nature and subsequent dehumanization 
of humanity. He argues: 
We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may "conquer" them. 
We are always conquering Nature, because "Nature" is the name for what 
we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a 
thing as mere Nature. Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. 
The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them; the 
soul does not become Nature till we can psycho-analyse her. The wresting 
of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature ... as 
soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of 
mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who 
stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the 
same.
172 
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However, a distinction is made between science and scientism, the latter being 
seen as the underlying force behind modernism. Postmodern scholar Walter Truett 
Anderson defines scientism merely as "the worship of facts," whereas science, properly 
understood, is "the constant attempt to falsify one's hypotheses and find better ones." 173 
Michael Aeschliman says that scientism is "a misuse of science ... the misapplication of 
scientific method" because it acknowledges only what is observable. 174 Thomas C. Peters 
says scientism is neither the careful empirical methods nor the wonderfully beneficial 
discoveries of true science, but a "unique combination of atheism, materialist philosophy, 
evolutionism, hostility to religion, and doctrinaire adherence to the universal validity of 
the scientific method." 175 Carnell suggests that the sin of Weston and Devine is "not in 
their method but in trying to use that method out of its proper place." 176 In That Hideous 
Strength, among other places, Lewis makes this distinction explicit: "The physical 
sciences, good and innocent in themselves, had already, even in Ransom's own time, 
begun to be warped, had been subtly manoeuvred in a certain direction. Despair of 
objective truth had been increasingly insinuated into the scientists; indifference to it, and 
a concentration upon mere power, had been the result."177 
Apparently Lewis was concerned that scientism was corrupting the innocence of 
science in the name of power and progress. He looked beyond the temporal and 
envisioned science conquering not just the earth but other worlds as well. That Hideous 
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Strength shows science without God or morals, manipulating systems and experimenting 
on children and criminals. 178 Scientists and ethicists may debate whether Lewis' concerns 
were valid. However, they cannot debate that he had them. 
Sehnsucht and the Search for Joy 
A common thread throughout C. S. Lewis' life was his search for Joy-a mystical 
search which appeals to the postmodern mind, and the third aspect of his anti-
foundationalist streak. While Lewis argued much of his apologetics from a 
foundationalist standpoint, seeking to prove incorrigible foundations for Christianity did 
not fill a void in his life; from his earliest years he believed there was more to learn and 
understand. This journey was a mystical one, perhaps best described in The Pilgrim's 
Regress. 179 
Lewis' concept of Joy was certainly not based on foundationalism. He made no 
propositional statements, no clinical diagnoses to define it. In fact, he could only describe 
it as "an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction" 
characterized by "the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again." 180 He 
even called it "something quite different from ordinary life ... something, as they would 
now say, 'in another dimension .... "' 181 This parallels the view of Murphy and 
McClendon that postmodernism admits to dimensions outside of their three-axis, three-
dimensional model. Indeed, Lewis attempted to explain something that could not be 
placed anywhere within the model of modernity. 
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Lewis called it Sehnsucht-a German word for a keen, poignant longing or 
yearning, similar to nostalgia in that it implies alienation from what is desired. 182 There is 
more to the word than mere representation of an intangible object; defining sehnsucht this 
way excludes emotion and experience from its meaning and fails to capture the sense of 
the word. Sehnen is the German root, meaning "to long for" or "to yearn after", and sucht 
indicates sickness, passion, or rage 183-that is, an almost unbearable intensity of emotion. 
Sehnsucht denotes a passion behind the longing, a homesickness for a place not visited in 
many years. 
Lewis first experienced Joy-this sharp pang of longing-as a "memory of a 
memory": 
As I stood beside a flowering currant bush on a summer day there 
suddenly arose in me without warning, and as if from a depth not of years 
but of centuries, the memory of that earlier morning at the 0 ld House 
when my brother had brought his toy garden into the nursery. It is difficult 
to find words strong enough for the sensation which came over me ... .It 
was a sensation, of course, of desire, but desire for what? Not, certainly, 
for a biscuit tin filled with moss, nor even (though that came into it) for 
my own past ... and before I knew what I desired, the desire itself was 
IM gone .... 
His second experience with Joy came as he read Squirrel Nutkin by Beatrix 
Potter: "It troubled me with what I can only describe as the Idea of Autumn. It sounds 
fantastic to say that one can be enamored of a season, but that is something like what 
happened .... And one went back to the book, not to gratify the desire but to reawake 
it."185 He recognized again that this experience was of great importance. 
His third came while reading about the death of Balder in Longfellow's Saga of 
King Olaf "I knew nothing about Balder; but instantly I was uplifted into huge regions of 
182 Carnell, 15. 
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northern sky, [and] I desired with almost sickening intensity something never to be 
described ... and then, as in the other examples, found myself at the very same moment 
already falling out of that desire and wishing I were back in it."186 
Lewis cautions the reader that although these three experiences might seem 
trivial, they are in fact the central basis for his life. It is through this search for Joy that he 
eventually comes into a relationship with Christ: if not for these experiences, he might 
have missed the experience of salvation altogether. 187 
The remainder of Lewis' life, at least up to his Christian conversion, was driven 
by his search for Joy-a series of mountaintops and valleys, finding that intense pang, 
losing it, and then trying to find it again. 
As a teenager, Lewis thought Joy was driving him toward sex, which he later 
learned had nothing to do with Joy. In fact, his experiments with sexual self-fulfillment 
had the opposite effect on Lewis: the cycle of temptation, guilt, and fierce prayers for 
deliverance which appeared to go unanswered contributed to his subsequent loss of faith 
as a young man. 188 
Lewis also sought Joy in magic and the occult, which he describes almost like a 
powerful drug addiction: "It is a spiritual lust; and like the lust of the body it has the fatal 
power of making everything else in the world seem uninteresting while it lasts. It is 
probably this passion, more even than the desire for power, which makes magicians."189 
Lewis later cautions that Joy is not to be confused with a thrill, as he had described in his 
occultic phase: "Only when your whole attention and desire are fixed on something 
186 Ibid. 
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else-whether a distant mountain, or the past, or the gods of Asgard-does the 'thrill' 
arise. It is a by-product. Its very existence presupposes that you desire not it but 
something other and outer. If by any perverse askesis or the use of any drug it could be 
produced from within, it would at once be seen to be of no value. For take away the 
object, and what, after all, would be left?-a whirl of images, a fluttering sensation in the 
diaphragm, a momentary abstraction." 190 
Lewis eventually came to realize that Joy was a desire for something else, 
something beyond itself Interestingly, in one of his foundationalist-based books, he 
declares that the object of Joy's desire is God alone: "He Himself is the fuel our spirits 
were designed to burn, the food our spirits were designed to feed on. There is no other. 
That is why it is just no good asking God to make us happy in our own way without 
bothering about religion. God cannot give us a happiness and peace apart from Himself, 
because it is not there." 191 
Lewis' Joy was beyond the realm of modernism-inexplicable, uncategorizable. 
There is nothing in either expressivist or representational language to describe it; it must 
be experienced. Joy does not mesh well with the maxims of foundationalism. Instead, it is 
found in the mystery embraced by postmodernism, a mystical thing which can be known 
only by experience. 
Lewis avidly pursued Joy in nature, art, literature and mythology, but these also 
turned up empty; until at last, through George Macdonald's Phantastes, the concept of 
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holiness entered his definition of Joy-and, over the next decade, he came to understand 
that "what he really wanted ... was to merge with the Absolute." 192 
At the end of his autobiography, Lewis explains the outcome of his quest for Joy. 
While his whole life was based on seeking it, Joy lost its importance once he converted to 
Christianity. Lewis claimed that although the "old stab" of Joy came to him with the 
same frequency and intensity after his conversion as before, it took on a different role. He 
writes, "It was valuable only as a pointer to something other and outer. While that other 
was in doubt, the pointer naturally loomed large in my thoughts." 193 Lewis' spirituality 
was not based on reason. When he struggled with doubt, his assurance came not from 
well-considered propositions, but from that longing which pointed to the Creator. Joy had 
become the assurance Lewis needed in his spiritual journey. 
In summary, though Lewis defended Christianity from a foundational standpoint, 
he was not a foundationalist in the modernist sense of the word. Through the death of his 
wife, his early foundationalist explanations collapsed. The very answers he gave in The 
Problem of Pain, he found himself questioning in A Grief Observed. Nevertheless, 
through his grief, Lewis passed a spiritual milestone in his faith-a depth that could 
never be achieved through rational observations and theology lessons. 
Next, Lewis questioned the ability of science to reveal all knowledge and 
expressed a serious mistrust of scientism. This questioning can be seen as somewhat 
blasphemous to modernism's primary religion: an amoral scientism. His reservations can 
be found through the full spectrum of his writings, and he constantly raises concerns 
about science's conquest of nature and dehumanization of people. 
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The third anti-foundational aspect of Lewis is more positive in nature: a belief 
that there is something more than mere foundations, namely the transcendent experience 
he called Joy. He portrays God as a chess master who used this longing for Joy to draw 
Lewis to himself, and eventually to faith in Christ, who is the object of Joy. 
Through these three aspects of anti-foundationalism, Lewis questioned the black-
and-white foundations of modernism. He saw more gray areas and acknowledged the 
mysteries of life and nature, as well as the supernatural. 
Lewis' Use of Narrative 
Story arose as a result ofpostmodernism's rejection ofthe "Enlightenment 
hubris" 194 with its three metanarratives-rationalism, scientism and consumerism. 195 
Grenz says: 
As the twentieth century unfolded, anthropologists became increasingly 
aware ofthe foundational importance of myths in human society. Some 
scholars argued that myths are more than just stories that primitive 
cultures tell; in fact, they embody the central core of a culture's values and 
beliefs and are in that sense fundamentally religious .... Postmodern 
thinkers speak of these systems oflegitimizing myths as 'narratives' (or 
'metanarratives'). They contend that a narrative exercises a force apart 
from argumentation and proof and, in fact, that it provides the principal 
means by which every community legitimates itself. 196 
Early in his autobiography, Lewis shows this emphasis on individual story. He 
claims his early experiences of Joy so defined his personal story that if the reader finds no 
interest in them, there is no point in reading further. 197 
194 Ibid., 44. 
195 Fergus Macdonald, "The Story and the Myth," Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 16 
(Spring, 1998): 35. 
196 Grenz, Primer, 44. 
197 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 17. 
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The authority of knowledge in postmodernism comes not from empirical evidence 
or logical argument, but from the narrator herself. Lyotard states that narrative is 
comprised of three parts: the sender, the addressee and the hero. At one point, the sender 
(narrator) is the addressee (narratee) as the story is transmitted to her. The fact that she 
has heard the story is what gives her authority; she now becomes the authority on the 
story merely because she has heard it herself. 198 
In the Screwtape Letters, Lewis uses this same technique with a twist. The reader 
eavesdrops as the sender, Screwtape, transmits knowledge to the addressee, Wormwood. 
In this way the reader becomes a kind of secondary or invisible addressee, who gains 
knowledge of demons and their plan, and thus also becomes an authority. 
As the narrator of the Narnia Chronicles, Lewis often interrupts the story to 
comment to the addressee. For example, in Voyage of the Dawn Treader, as Eustace 
stumbles into a dragon's lair, Lewis quips: "Most of us know what we should expect to 
find in a dragon's lair, but, as I said before, Eustace had read only the wrong books." 199 
Here Lewis is the sender of the story, the reader is the addressee and Eustace is the 
object. Lewis claims to know about dragons simply because he has read the right books, 
and assumes the reader has too. If the reader is not already an authority on dragons, he 
will be after hearing Lewis' story. Eustace, on the other hand, knows nothing because has 
not heard the stories. Although the point of the book is not to make the reader an expert 
on dragons but to expose Eustace's fundamental character flaw (that is, his dragonish 
heart), this wry, charming passage delivers a powerful point which underscores that 
authority is transmitted through story. 
198 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 20-21. 
199 C. S. Lewis, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1952), 92-93. 
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Story is what legitimizes authority in the postmodern context. The modernist may 
"prove" scientifically that dragons are not real, but to the postmodernist, such proofs do 
not necessarily constitute complete knowledge. In postmodernism, authority is not based 
on rational proofs but is passed from sender to addressee through story. The sender 
transmits the story to the addressee, who now has the authority and competence to 
become a sender of the story. 
Though this example is from a children's fantasy, it shows Lewis' understanding 
of the power of story to impart knowledge. Postmodernism had just been born when the 
Narnia Chronicles were written; however, this is what makes Lewis such an interesting 
paradigm for the modern-postmodern transitional age. He never completely fit the mold 
of modernism, and postmodernism was too new for him to align himself with it 
consciously in his lifetime. However, he was a master storyteller with a brilliant 
imagination. It is less likely that Lewis decided to adopt postmodernism than that he 
simply transcended it-especially in the way he communicated the story of Christianity 
through narrative. 
The Three Acts of Story and Mystery 
Story is, in essence, a three-act play: a beginning, a middle and an end.200 
Macintyre sees human life or selfhood as a "concept of self whose unity resides in the 
200 Madan Sarup, Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1996), 15. See also Loren Wilkinson "Stories, Your Story and God's Story," Crux Vol. 33, no. 3 
(September 1997): 30. 
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unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to 
end. "201 He notes this pattern of story in all things human: 
Indeed a conversation is a dramatic work, even if a very short one, in 
which the participants are not only the actors, but also the joint authors, 
working out in agreement or disagreement the mode of their production. 
For it is not just that conversations belong to genres in just the way that 
plays and novels do; but they have beginnings, middles and endings just as 
do literary works. They embody reversals and recognitions; they move 
towards and away from climaxes. There may within a longer conversation 
be digressions and subplots, indeed digressions within digressions and 
subplots within subplots. But if this is true of conversations, it is true also 
mutates mutandis ofbattles, chess games, courtships, philosophy 
seminars, families at the dinner table, businessmen negotiating contracts-
that is, of human transactions in general. 202 
Life and knowledge consist not of absolute foundations, but of individual stories. 
Scripture, in a postmodern worldview, is seen as narrative and not a book of systematic, 
categorized doctrines and theologies. Modernism has effectively reduced the Bible to a 
series of propositions and thus trivialized the Christian faith. Interestingly, however, the 
Bible seems to fit more comfortably in the postmodern worldview, as a presentation of 
God's story, than in the modern worldview as a book of truisms and maxims. Trevor Hart 
writes: "It is the story of God's dealings with his world and with his creatures in and 
through the particular histories of Israel and Jesus the Christ. It is this story-the gospel 
or good news focused in Jesus-upon the basis of which the church today fashions its 
identity, and in conformity to the contours of which it seeks to live its life. To be a 
201 Alasdair Macintyre, "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition," 
From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Cahoone, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1996), 536. 
202 Ibid., 541. 
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Christian is in some sense to have one's own story shaped in a decisive way by and taken 
up into this other larger story of God's redemptive action in the world. "203 
Like all stories, the Bible also asserts a theme. It is a book of the human 
condition, a collection of human stories making up the larger story of God's redemption. 
There is always a beginning, middle and end. The author of Ecclesiastes sums up the 
human story in seven verses, first by very briefly acknowledging the beginning and the 
end ("a time to be born and a time to die"), and then using the remaining verses to 
describe the middle (3:2-8). In the Bible story, the first act begins definitively with n'iPWlil 
-berosheet-"in the beginning." At the other end of the story, Revelation describes in 
symbolism and metaphor the end of the biblical narrative. There is a divine proclamation 
in Revelation 22:21-"va(, EPXOflal Taxu" ("Yes! I am coming soon!") and a response 
"A[l~V, Epxou KUPLE'lr]CJoD" ("Amen, Come Lord Jesus!"). Thus, the Bible story ends. 
There is an unwritten rule of storytelling: begin the story as close to the action as 
possible. Bring the story as close to the present (read: the middle) as possible. Too much 
detail not only bores the recipient but also lessens the intrigue of the story. A great 
storyteller finds wealth in mystery. An effective story's opening and closing chapters 
have little to say. Unanswered questions and darkened comers of the past deepen the 
story and cause wonder. Predictability provides little reason to progress, and interest in 
the story remains on a shallow level. Unpredictability is a good rule of thumb for the 
beginning novelist, a guideline which might well have been inspired by the 
unpredictability of the human story. 
203 Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics ofChristian Theology (Downer's Grove, IL: 
Intervarsity Press, 1995), 143. 
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The great mystery of story lies in the beginning and the end. Much time, money 
and energy has been spent asking the unanswerable questions, "Where did I come from? 
Why am I here? Where am I going?" Wilkinson explains: 
Even when we know the main details of our lives-which most of us do-
most of us have entertained the possibility that there might be more: that if 
there isn't some mystery about us, there ought to be. Perhaps this is 
because the details themselves aren't enough to match the depth we feel 
within us .... Our own memory emerges out of the mist. We don't 
remember much at all of the things which shaped us. We know our past by 
hearsay, and pictures in old photo albums. But direct memory of the first 
part of our individual stories is not available to us. 204 
Perhaps, Wilkinson ponders, this is why people are so fascinated by adopted 
children, or amnesiacs searching to fill the unknown gaps in their lives. 
The Great Divorce also follows the postmodern pattern of story, especially in the 
way it begins and ends in mystery. At the very beginning, the narrator finds himself 
inexplicably standing in a bus queue "by the side of a long, mean street," observing the 
darkened gray city around him. The sense is surreal because he does not know how he 
got there, but he does not question it and immediately begins participating in the story. 
Even then, the images are not concrete. The narrator "seems" to be standing there; time 
has paused, and he can discern little about the strange city or the other people in the 
queue, except that they tend to be negative, reluctant to wait, and unhappy. When the bus 
does arrive and the people board it, the narrator and the reader still have no knowledge of 
its purpose, origin, or destination. 205 
The ending is just as mysterious: the narrator suddenly snaps out of slumber to the 
striking of a clock and the wailing of a siren?06 Nothing more is said. No chapter is added 
204 Ibid., 30. 
205 Lewis, Great Divorce, 13. 
206 Ibid., 125. 
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to tell what the narrator did about the dream after waking, nor how it changed him or his 
life. The end of the narrator's story remains a mystery, despite new revelations 
discovered within the dream. 
Mystery is found throughout the Narnia Chronicles as well. Originally, The Lion, 
the Witch, and the Wardrobe was the first book of the series, published in 1950. From 
this story, the reader has no knowledge about the wardrobe. How has it come to be a 
doorway into Narnia? How does it link Narnia to England? For that matter, what is the 
background of Professor Digory, the owner of the house with the wardrobe? The reader 
suspects Digory knows something about the wardrobe when Lucy's tales ofNarnia are 
challenged by her siblings, and Digory points out that logic supports Lucy's story: "There 
are only three possibilities. Either your sister is telling lies, or she is mad, or she is telling 
the truth. You know she doesn't tell lies and it is obvious that she is not mad. For the 
moment then and unless any further evidence turns up, we must assume that she is telling 
the truth."207 Professor Digory's use of reason to support the possibility of realities 
beyond reason echoes Lewis' argument for the existence of God in Mere Christianity. 
To the very end of this book, Lewis offers no explanation about the mystery of 
the wardrobe. Not until he publishes The Magician's Nephew in 1955 (which in later 
printings becomes the first of the Narnia Chronicles) is the origin of the wardrobe is 
revealed as made from a tree that had been brought back from Narnia and had grown in 
Digory's backyard. Even then, though Lewis explained the mystery behind the wardrobe, 
he introduces a whole new mystery to the origin issue: where did Digory's magician 
uncle get the magic rings that first send Digory to Narnia? That riddle is never solved. 
The beginning and end remain mysteries. 
207 C. S. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1950), 52. 
Page 74 
Another great mystery concerns Reepicheep, the talking mouse, whose story is 
told in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader. He first appears in Prince Caspian as if from 
nowhere; his origins, like most characters in these and other stories, are never revealed, 
although it is hinted that his ancestors freed Asian by chewing off the ropes that bound 
him on the Stone Table in The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe. Reepicheep, one of 
the most humorous of all Lewis' characters, is brave, bold, and fiercely loyal to Caspian 
and to Narnia. However, one thing surpasses even this allegiance: his desire to meet 
Asian at the end of the world. When finally the seafaring children reach the Last Sea, he 
says his goodbyes, paddles to the place where the world ends, and vanishes over the edge. 
"Since that moment," concludes Lewis, "no one can truly claim to have seen Reepicheep 
the Mouse. But my belief is that he came safe to Asian's country and is alive there to this 
d ,208 ay. 
Postmodernism is less concerned with origins than with the middle of the story. 
While there is a teleological consideration in narrative-that the story is taking the person 
somewhere-efforts to discover that destination are secondary to where the person is 
now. Postmodernism focuses on the middle, on attempting to understanding what story a 
person is a part of. 
The conclusion of this story has yet to take place; in "real life," Christianity finds 
itself still in the middle of the Bible story. As the church lives in the middle of the Bible 
story, individuals live in the middle of their own stories. Wilkinson writes, "To be in the 
middle is the human condition .... [F]inding oneself in the middle of a story whose end is a 
mystery is not a unique or vaguely shameful situation. It is the situation we all are in: 
208 Lewis, Dawn Treader, 226. 
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middled, and muddled-in the middle of a story, in the middle ofajourney."209 Being in 
the middle creates in the participants a struggle to understand their own individual roles, 
as well as the role they might play in another's story. Macintyre explains: 
We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part 
of an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character 
in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each 
drama constrains the others. In my drama, perhaps, I am Hamlet or Iago or 
at least the swineherd who may yet become a prince, but to you I am only 
A Gentleman or at best Second Murderer, while you are my Polonius or 
my Gravedigger, but your own hero. Each of our dramas exerts constraints 
on each other's, making the whole different from the parts, but still 
dramatic.210 
The tension ofliving one's own story while relating to others' stories adds depth 
to a story. Wilkinson says that as individuals "we want to see our lives as part of a larger 
story. Our great question therefore is to find out what story we are in and what our place 
in it is ... We find ourselves in the middle of a story-but what story?"211 
Macintyre argues that the quest to solve life's mystery shapes and strengthens 
character. "It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with 
the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any 
quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood. 
A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-
knowledge."212 
Macintyre sees two elements within the mystery of story that fuel these quests: 
unpredictability and teleological character: "Like characters in a fictional narrative we do 
not know what will happen next, but nonetheless our lives have a certain form which 
209 Wilkinson, 30-3 I. 
210 Macintyre, 544. 
211 Wilkinson, 31. 
212 Macintyre, 550. 
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projects itself towards our future." Concerning unpredictability, he states, "It is crucial 
that at any given point in an enacted dramatic narrative we do not know what will happen 
next."213 Why? Because, in story, there needs to be progression, a process that is directed 
toward an end. A predictable book will lie unfinished; there is no desire to continue to 
read ifthe story is already known. In the human story, Macintyre argues: "We live out 
our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in the light of certain 
conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which certain possibilities beckon us 
forward and others repel us, some seen already foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. 
There is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of 
the future which always presents itself in the form of a telos--or of a variety of ends or 
goals-toward which we are either moving or failing to move in the present."214 Madan 
Sarup ponders these elements by looking back on the life story: 
In our reflections we consider what the possible paths were, and what 
would have happened if we had chosen them. What would have happened 
ifl had said 'yes'? What ifl hadn't done that? We still ask these questions 
even if nothing can be done about these decisions taken so many years 
ago. We still ask these questions even though we know that we can never 
know what the 'right' decision would have been. We often consider 
alternatives, but we do not continue to explore imaginatively all the 
bifurcating paths.215 
Grenz urges that the church "must make room for the concept of 'mystery'-not 
as an irrational complement to the rational but as a reminder that the fundamental reality 
of God transcends human rationality." Later, he adds, "Central to our task in thinking 
through the faith in a postmodern context is an obligation to rethink the function of 
assertions of truths or propositions. We must continue to acknowledge the fundamental 
213 Ibid., 546. 
214 Ibid., 546. 
215 Sarup, 25. 
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importance of rational discourse, but our understanding of the faith must not remain 
fixated on the propositionalist approach that views Christian truths as nothing more than 
correct doctrine or doctrinal truth."216 It is this mystery that gives meaning to a person's 
story, and thus to the person's life. It shapes identity. Marva Dawn describes a key 
component to the church's mission to the postmodem world: "One great challenge for 
people in our times is the lack of genuine story, one that is coherent and gives meaning to 
their lives. "217 
Redemption and Narrative Convergence 
Whether postmodems know it or not, God is the author and ultimate goal of their 
stories-the "larger story" they are seeking. Macdonald explains, "The danger is that we 
stop at the initial point of contact, rather than helping people to see that their felt needs 
are symptoms of a greater need-the need for redemption."218 That need for redemption 
climaxes in the center of God's story with a narrative convergence between God and 
humanity, the Incarnation. Through Christ, God transcends distant natural laws and 
involves himself directly in the story of each individual. Lewis' most profound example 
of this narrative convergence is in the Narnia Chronicles. 
To the postmodem, each person is the owner of his or her own story, and no story 
is seen as greater than the other. There is no grand metanarrative that transcends all other 
stories; each person's story is independent. 
Lewis illustrates this masterfully in A Horse and His Boy, the story of a desperate 
mission to save Namia from military occupation. The hero is lost in despair on a dark 
216 Grenz, Primer, 170. 
217 Marva Dawn, "Pop Spirituality or Genuine Story," Word & World, 18 no. 1 (Winter 1998): 45. 
218 Macdonald, 43. 
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road when suddenly Asian appears, walking with him and telling his story: "I was the 
lion who forced you to join with Aravis. I was the cat who comforted you among the 
houses of the dead. I was the lion who drove the jackals from you while you slept. ... And 
I was the lion you do not remember who pushed the boat in which you lay, a child near 
death, so that it came to shore where a man sat, wakeful at midnight, to receive you." 
However, when Shasta inquires about Aravis' life, Asian replies, "I am telling you your 
story, not hers. I tell no one any story but his own."219 
Later, Asian comes to Aravis to explain her story: "The scratches on your back, 
tear for tear, throb for throb, blood for blood, were equal to the stripes laid on the back of 
your stepmother's slave because ofthe drugged sleep you cast upon her. You needed to 
know what it felt like." But when Aravis asks what became of the slave, Asian responds 
again, "I am telling you your story, not hers. No one is told any story but their own." 220 
While emphasizing individual stories in the Narnia Chronicles, Lewis is equally 
effective at illustrating narrative convergence, when God's story comes down and blends 
with each person's own story. Throughout the books, Asian's story continually converges 
with the characters' own stories. In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, he appears only in 
Eustace's story to remove the skin of the dragon which Eustace had become.221 In The 
Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, he dies to pay for the sins of one-Edmund-and 
salvation is presented not on a grand scale but on an intimate, individuallevel.222 In 
Prince Caspian, he appears only to Lucy while she is still with the others: "I can see him 
219 Lewis, A Horse, 175-6. 
220 Ibid., 216. 
221 Lewis, Voyage, 112-115. 
222 Lewis, Lion, 155-157. 
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all the time," she states to Edmund. "He's looking straight at us."223 The rest of the group 
fails to see Asian, though he is standing among them. 
The Narnia Chronicles illustrate the redemption that comes as a result of this 
narrative convergence between God's and a human's stories. In this way, Lewis shows 
that although Christ died for the whole world, in a deeper sense redemption is an 
individual event, rather than an archetypical event to redeem a faceless global 
community. Though there are many accounts of redemption in the Narnia Chronicles, 
two stand out among the rest: the convergence of Aslan with the characters of Edmund 
and Eustace. 
In The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe, Asian strikes a deal with the White 
Witch for the soul of Edmund the traitor, and as a result Asian must be sacrificed. The 
crucifixion is beautifully pictured in this children's tale as Asian willingly surrenders to 
the witch and her army, allowing himself to be bound upon an altar and finally run 
through with a sword. However, Asian comes back to life, much to the children's thrilled 
astonishment. 
"But what does it all mean?'' asked Susan when they were 
somewhat calmer. 
"It means," said Asian, "that though the Witch knew the Deep 
Magic, there is a magic deeper still which she did not know. Her 
knowledge goes back only to the dawn of time. But if she could have 
looked a little further back, into the stillness and the darkness before Time 
dawned, she would have read there a different incantation. She would 
have known that when a willing victim who had committed no treachery 
was killed in a traitor's stead, the Table would crack and Death itself 
would start working backward. "224 
In this scene, Lewis offers certainly one of the clearest literary examples ever 
written of atonement and grace. Soteriology is explained not as a series of propositions in 
223 C. S. Lewis, Prince Caspian (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1951 ), 152. 
224 Lewis, Lion, 178 
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a theologian's treatise. The workings are presented by Lewis in a narrative as an example 
of convergence of the stories of the divine and humanity. Here the reader can understand 
how Christ's death relates to the individual on a personal and intimate level. 
While Edmund's story explains Asian's act ofredemption, Eustace's focuses on 
the result of this act upon a person. In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, Eustace, through 
his own greed and selfishness, has turned into a dragon. He is disconsolate because he 
can neither communicate with the other children nor fit into their boat, which is his only 
chance of returning home. As if in a vision, Asian appears and tells him to peel off his 
dragon-skin, which he tries in vain to do. Finally Aslan offers to do it for him: "The very 
first tear he made was so deep that I thought it had gone right into my heart. And when he 
began pulling the skin off, it hurt worse than anything I've ever felt. The only thing that 
made me able to bear it was just the pleasure of feeling the stuff peel off. ,ms 
The narrator goes on to wrap up the work of Aslan upon Eustace's body and 
character. "It would be nice, and fairly nearly true, to say that 'from that time forth 
Eustace was a different boy.' To be strictly accurate, he began to be a different boy. He 
had relapses. There were still many days when he could be very tiresome. But most of 
those I shall not notice. The cure had begun."226 Indeed Eustace goes on to appear as a 
primary character and hero in the final two books ofNarnia-definitely a changed young 
man. 
Edmund and Eustace illustrate the theme of redemption in the Narnia Chronicles. 
In these children's fantasies, Lewis uses narrative imaginatively to communicate the 
saving grace of Christ, so that even the casual reader might understand. 
225 Lewis, Voyage, 115-116. 
226 Lewis, Voyage, 119-120. 
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In The Great Divorce, the theme of sinful bondage and redemption is revisited 
when an Angel meets a Ghost with a lizard on his shoulder. At first, the Ghost seems to 
control lizard, but soon it is clear that the lizard is in control. The Angel asks over and 
over again to kill the lizard, but the Ghost gives many excuses: he wants the advice of a 
doctor, he wants to discuss it later, he fears its removal might kill him, and he fears it will 
hurt too much (note the presence of pain in redemption in this example and in the 
example of Eustace). When the Ghost finally lets the Angel kill it, the Ghost becomes a 
man of glorious substance and the lizard a beautiful stallion, which he mounts and rides 
off toward the distant mountains.227 
The difference between Lewis' apologetic works and his imaginative works might 
be defined this way: when he wanted to defend the gospel, he used reason and 
argument-but when he wanted to communicate the gospel, he used story. Indeed, Lewis 
harnessed the power of story to enable the message to be received and understood by 
ordinary people. Lewis presents the story at the point where every reader is located in 
relation to his own life story: in the middle. In this way a commonality, and thus a 
relationship, develops between Lewis and the reader. Lewis seems to understand the 
power of story and uses it masterfully with an "economy of metaphors"228 in a way that 
neither forces biblical truths on his readers, nor insults their intelligence by explaining the 
metaphors. Francis Rossow writes, "Whenever Lewis throws a Gospel-rock into the 
water, the reader not only recognizes the point of impact but also experiences the thrill of 
seeing an ever widening circle of doctrinal ripples."229 He emphasizes not the foundations 
227 Lewis, Great Divorce, 97-101. 
228 Francis C. Rossow, "Giving Christian Doctrine a New Translation: Selected Examples from the 
Novels of C. S. Lewis," Concordia Journa/21 (July 1995): 282. 
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of Christianity but the story itself, and this is why, posthumously, he still enjoys a huge 
following among those with a different worldview-the postmodem worldview-than 
the one he lived with for most of his life. 
The theologian has difficulty attempting to argue against theology found in story, 
because story is not the proper playing field for such a debate. Story presents the human 
condition through characters and scenarios. The reader can relate to these characters 
because story is living and active.230 According to Lyotard, it is through story that true 
knowledge is developed. Narrative defines competence by a three-fold criterion: know-
how, knowing how to speak, and knowing how to hear.231 
Similarly, the Narnia Chronicles communicate on an individual level, telling each 
person's own story. This might explain their popularity not only among children, but 
among adults-teachers, pastors and theologians. Difficult theological concepts and 
divine mysteries are presented not as intellectual propositions, but as stories lived out 
simply in the lives of the characters. The reader can relate to characters more easily than 
to abstract ideas because abstraction divorces truth from life, and thus is helped to 
understand the narrative convergence between God's story and the reader's story. 
Language Games 
William C. Placher notes that "Philosophers go astray when they try to impose 
one set of rules on all forms of language. It makes no sense for scientists to condemn 
poets because their statements cannot be empirically tested, for instance, just as it makes 
no sense for a soccer fan to condemn basketball players for picking up the ball with their 
230 Perhaps this is why story is so effective at reaching people with truth-because it echoes the 
communication methods of the Master Communicator, whose Word is "living and active, sharper than any 
two-edged sword" (Hebrews 4: 12). 
131 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 21. 
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hands-that would be judging by the rules of the wrong game. "232 Modernism, by 
limiting itself to one way of using language, has judged reality by the rules of the wrong 
game. Postmodernism sees language as unlimited. 
Language games were first described by Austrian philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. He asserts that each use of language exists within a separate and unique set 
of rules, and during the dialogue, the participants must become aware of the rules within 
that particular discourse. Lyotard likens language games to chess, in which pre-set rules 
determine the way each piece is allowed to move. He adds that "Great joy is had in the 
endless invention ofturns of phrase, of words and meanings ... But undoubtedly even this 
pleasure depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an adversary-at least one 
adversary, and a formidable one: the acceptable language, or connotation." 233 Grenz 
notes that adopting language games is the first step to rejecting an objective reality. He 
writes, "No proposition can be limited to a single meaning ... because its meaning is 
necessarily dependant on its context, the 'language game' in which it appears. Thus, any 
sentence has as many meanings as the contexts in which it is used. "234 
In the newspaper articles which became The Screwtape Letters, Lewis invented a 
clever language game to illustrate the inner workings of evil by turning common 
Christian terminology on its head. What Christians call "bad" and "evil," Screwtape, a 
demon, naturally considers "good." What Christians call "God," Screwtape of course 
calls "the Enemy." In this way, all the normal uses of these words are inverted. White is 
black, black is white-the reader is forced to participate in the language game to 
232 William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), 58. 
233 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 10. 
234 Grenz, Primer, 114. 
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understand the book. The story has already been mentioned earlier of one offended 
minister who, failing to understand the rules of this particular game, apparently believed 
that Lewis himself (not Screwtape, the demon who used the language in this upside-down 
way) was advocating sinful behavior and canceled his subscription to the newspaper. 
Lewis and Myth 
Alasdair Macintyre expands on this way of thinking: "Deprive children of stories 
and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence 
there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except 
through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. Mythology, in 
its original sense, is at the heart ofthings."235 
The church is reluctant to associate myth with the Bible. Perhaps it feels that 
labeling Christianity a myth would identify it as untrue, or would reduce it to one story 
among many, just another myth among thousands. However, myth does not mean a 
fictional tale, but rather a "figural or poetic rendering of divine purpose and activity" 
which is "necessary for the kind of truth the Bible conveys."236 Myth then is a story of 
God directly at work in the human condition. 
Lewis supports this concept of myth. He sees human intellect as incurably 
abstract and experience as the only concrete reality. Through myth, Lewis argues, one 
can experience a reality that would otherwise be just an abstraction: 
What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always 
about something, but reality is that about which truth is), and, therefore, 
every myth becomes the father of innumerable truths on the abstract level. 
Myth is the mountain whence all the different streams arise which become 
235 Macintyre, 54 7. 
236 Henry H. Knight III, A Future for Truth: Evangelical Theology in a Postmodern World 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1997), 110. 
truths down here in the valley .... Or, if you prefer, myth is the isthmus 
which connects the peninsular world of thought with that vast continent 
we really belong to. It is not, like truth, abstract; nor is it, like direct 
experience, bound to the particular.237 
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Lewis contends that just as God became man without ceasing to be God, so myth 
has become fact without ceasing to be myth. The importance of myth is so great that he 
even states: "A man who disbelieved the Christian story as fact but continually fed on it 
as myth would, perhaps, be more spiritually alive than one who assented and did not 
think much about it .... God is more than a god, not less; Christ is more than Balder, not 
less. If God chooses to be mythopoeic-and is not the sky itself a myth-shall we refuse 
to be mythopoeic? For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: perfect myth and perfect 
fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and 
delight .... "238 
Lewis found a uniqueness in Christianity, a richness in its story and myth. As a 
literary critic and professor of medieval literature, as well as an appreciator ofNorse and 
Celtic myth, he not only developed a sincere love of story but also learned to detect myth 
from historical fact. He saw the power of story to communicate; he saw the world of truth 
it can open. He saw narrative as a tool for communicating truth to his fellow human 
beings, choosing to speak through children's tales and other forms of story. Through his 
love for mythology and literature he learned the art of suggesting truth to the reader 
through the actions-both positive and negative--of the characters, rather than through 
didactic lessons or moral propositions that others can simply choose to accept or reject. 
Story, for Lewis, became a vehicle to present Christ's salvation and doctrine to an 
unbelieving world. Through story, the reader becomes engaged with the characters and 
237 Lewis, Grand Miracle, 41. 
238 Lewis, Grand Miracle, 42. 
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progresses with them through the mountains and valleys of their quest. Story makes 
people think in an entirely different way. It forces them to experience truth. 
One misconception about postmodernism is that it rejects absolute truth. This is 
only partially true: it rejects the modernist definition of truth, which is confined to only 
that which can be proven. Truth has a different value to the postmodernist; it means 
something entirely different. The truth the postmodernist seeks is not found in a book of 
propositions and well-argued systematized doctrine. It is found in life, which is to say 
that truth abstracted from life is not truth, or at least is worthless to life. If philosophy 
hopes to address us as incarnated, involved, active and ever changing living creatures. 
The only way to capture this aspect of the human condition is through narrative. 
Without fully knowing what postmodernism would become, Lewis utilized a tool 
that is completely postmodern. Through the other lands, worlds, planets and even 
dimensions (as in The Screwtape Letters or The Great Divorce) created in his stories, 
Lewis is able to present the gospel in a way theological treatises cannot, and therefore is 
able to explain Christianity far more effectively than academic theologians ever could. To 
Lewis, the birth and life of Christ came out of myth, and he had no difficulty returning 
Christianity full circle back to its roots. Perhaps this is why Lewis' most popular work is 
his fiction. He saw Christianity as alive, and only through story could he have treated the 
truths of this faith so well. 
Conclusion 
No doubt the reader will find exceptions to what has been written in this study of 
C. S. Lewis, probably in the writings of Lewis himself. He vehemently rejects 
subjectivism and trumpets reason, yet also condemns modernist liberal theology. He 
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claims like a true modernist that words and language represent objects, yet also dabbles 
in postmodern language games, which change word meanings in each new context. 
In fact, as a result of modernism's dominance over western culture for the last 
three centuries, individuals have been mistakenly trying to pigeonhole people into certain 
categories. It is impossible to paint Lewis with a single broad stroke. He writes fiction, 
yet defends truth. He is a foundationalist, yet a mystic. He argues for Moral Law, yet sees 
truth in things beyond it such as myth. He insists he is not a theologian, yet he illustrates 
profound doctrines through children, a lion, and a knee-high talking mouse. 
Above all, however, C. S. Lewis is a paradox of worldviews. To the modernist, he 
is a champion of foundational apologetics, reductionistic individualism, and the 
representational theory of language. For devotional readings, the modernist might suggest 
Miracles, The Problem of Pain, or Mere Christianity. However, to the postmodern, Lewis 
is a storyteller, a questioner of empirical propositions and a respecter of mystery. For a 
devotional, the postmodern might choose The Great Divorce or all seven books of The 
Chronicles ofNarnia. 
Neither view is complete, nor can either paint a complete picture of Lewis without 
the other. Lewis, in fact, transcended both worldviews, for he had developed that greatest 
of all perspectives: a kingdom worldview that kneels to no other. In this worldview, 
Lewis found the freedom to take the best of both modernism and postmodernism (which 
encompasses everything that is not modernism) and create fresh new ways to tell a 
timeless story of eternal salvation. While there are many intellectual signposts on his 
journey toward God, there are also a number of spiritual or even mystical experiences, 
and he invites both modernists and postmodernists to come along. Francis Rossow states: 
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"The customary language for doctrine becomes so familiar we don't hear it, or, if we do, 
it goes in one ear and out the other. .. Lewis not only provides us specific ways to [put the 
old wine of Christian doctrine into new wineskins] but also functions as a catalyst to 
come up with our own fresh and imaginative ways to communicate Spiritual truth."239 He 
found no limits to his methodology. If he chose to debate doctrine, he wrote a reasoned 
apologetic. If he chose to bring it to life, however, he wrote a story. 
As the church enters with the rest of the world into the twenty-first century, it 
finds itself in somewhat of an identity crisis, reacting in one of two ways to the rise of 
postmodernism: either standing boldly yet ignorantly against it, or wrapping itself 
completely within it and building a new "postmodern church." Both paths are extreme. 
The beginning of the twenty-first century sees society in a postmodern worldview. 
Yet postmodernism finds modernism as its source of strength by feeding off of it. 
Postmodernism exists for one reason: to stand against its predecessor. It exists to correct 
modernism. In a sense, postmodernism is a virus. It lives off its host, unwittingly killing 
it in the process. Yet when the host is dead, the virus will die shortly thereafter. 
Modernism has been short-lived and has nearly disappeared; it is not the climax of 
history. Postmodernism is little more than a transition, a corrective reaction to the 
extremities of its predecessor. One can only guess what the next age will look like, but 
more than likely, it will not be postmodern. Perhaps it will resemble medieval times once 
again-the era which preceded modernism, and the era in which Lewis, as a literature 
professor, was an expert. 
For the church, this means one thing, as modeled by the paradigmatic example of 
C. S. Lewis: it must transcend both worldviews. Lewis showed a way to escape secular 
239 Rossow, 296. 
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worldviews and present the gospel any way one can: by being neither a modern nor a 
postmodern Christian, but a kingdom Christian with a kingdom worldview. When the 
church aligns itself with any other worldview, it is doomed to ineffectiveness when the 
secular worldview shifts again-and rest assured, it will. 
Before it rushes on to embrace the next rising worldview, the church can and 
should look at Lewis as one outstanding model for this kingdom worldview to better 
understand its role in the world. Whatever the literary form-autobiography or allegory, 
myth or metaphor, fantasy or apology-in the minds of his readers, he covered the 
territory thoroughly and compellingly, with an unparalleled balance of intrigue and 
clarity. He used every tool in his toolbox, from any and all worldviews. Perhaps the best 
explanation of his enduring appeal, through modernism, through postmodernism, and 
probably beyond, is found in this simple tribute from his sometime-critic, John Wilson: 
" ... Lewis was a good communicator. All his works are readable. He could 
communicate to people who had absolutely no theological, or biblical, knowledge. I 
would be hard pressed to think of any Christian writers who can do that today. "240 
Let the church take note. 
240 Wilson, 35. 
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